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I. INTRODUCTION
Assume that before jurors were chosen for Timothy McVeigh's
trial, federal prosecutors purchased advertising time on Denver televi-
sion stations to show pictures of the Oklahoma Federal Building in
ruins, of firefighter Chris Fields carrying a dead baby out of the rub-
ble, and of crying relatives looking at the devastation.1 Imagine that
at the end of each advertisement, superimposed over a particularly
heartwrenching picture, was the word "Remember."2 Or consider the
consequences if the plaintiffs' attorneys in the O.J. Simpson civil trial
had placed advertisements on Los Angeles County television stations
showing a white Ford Bronco slowly driving on a freeway, followed by
the word "Justice" overlaid on a single glove.3
Advertisements have rarely been the issue in prejudicial cases in
which extrajudicial publicity has allegedly caused unfair trials. In-
stead, these cases usually involve news stories revealing information
not admitted at trial, or inflammatory comments from attorneys. Ju-
dicial decisions and social science research concerning jury bias have
also dealt primarily with news reports-sometimes inaccurate, some-
times inflammatory-but news articles, nonetheless. However, adver-
tisements may be an even more serious impediment to empanelling a
fair jury than are news stories, since advertisements appeal to seated
or prospective jurors' emotions. As one commentator said: "Critics of
the jury system occasionally claim that jury verdicts are more likely to
be driven by whim, prejudice, or emotion than by the hard facts of the
case."
4
Research suggests that jurors acting on emotions will likely fail to
carefully consider evidence during deliberations.5 Studies also show
that advertising often effectively accomplishes its purpose by appeal-
1. See Tiny Victim Shown in Dramatic Photo, A 1-Year-Old Girl, Died of the Inju-
ries, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 1995, at A23.
2. The federal prosecutors in the McVeigh trial did not purchase television advertis-
ing time.
3. Of course, Daniel Petrocelli, the plaintiffs' lead lawyer in the civil case against
O.J. Simpson for the wrongful death of Ron Goldman, and John Kelly, represent-
ing Nicole Brown Simpson's estate, did nothing of the kind. See generally B.
Drummond Ayres Jr., Civil Jury Finds Simpson Liable in Pair of Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at Al (summarizing the result of the civil trial against O.J.
Simpson).
4. Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
137, 162 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
5. Kristy Lee Bertelson, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling for
Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. AD-
voc. 1, 28 (1998) (citing Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Com-
plex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 49 (1997)).
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ing to people's emotions. 6 If under some circumstances news reports
can bias a jury, advertisements about a pending trial certainly could
do the same. This Article argues that trial judges should, and do, have
the constitutional authority to order attorneys not to publish adver-
tisements about cases in which the attorneys are representing clients.
This contention is based on the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that trial
judges may prohibit officers of the court from extrajudicial speech rea-
sonably likely to cause an unfair trial.7 As this Article explains, ad-
vertisements are intended to influence people and, when used by
attorneys to reach potential or sitting jurors, may be more likely to
cause a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" than nearly any
other form of expression.8
Consider a civil case in which an attorney spoke to the public not
through interviews with reporters, but by placing advertisements on a
local cable television system. In April 2002, in an out-of-the-way
courthouse in Trinidad, Colorado, a defendant (Wal-Mart) was
granted a change of venue based on a finding that the plaintiff had
tainted the jury pool with prejudicial pretrial advertising.9 The ruling
was part of a class action suit by Wal-Mart pharmacists who claimed
that Wal-Mart had violated the terms of their employment contract,
particularly relating to overtime compensation.O
The basis for the change of venue request was two thirty-second
television commercials that the plaintiffs' law firm Frank Azar & As-
6. See generally COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO ADVERTISING (Patricia Caf-
ferata & Alice Tybout eds., 1989) (a collection of papers written by academic and
industrial researchers presenting ideas, theories, and approaches regarding con-
sumer responses to advertising); EMOTION IN ADVERTISING: THEORETICAL AND
PRACTICAL EXPLORATIONS (Stuart J. Agres et al. eds., 1990) (a collection of articles
written by various industry practitioners exploring the complex relationship be-
tween emotion and advertising).
7. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
8. Cf Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1073-74 (1991) (stating that lawyers, as officers of the
court, do not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States to the same extent as other professionals regarding their right
to solicit business and advertise).
9. Culver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99CV161 (Dist. Ct. Las Animas County,
Colo. filed Dec. 22, 1999).
10. Id. Approximately 9,000 former or current Wal-Mart Stores pharmacists were
members of the class nationwide, arguing that the company improperly took cer-
tain deductions from their paychecks and refused to pay them for overtime work.
The pharmacists claimed breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violation of
state labor laws. The plaintiffs asked for $200 million in damages. Record at
475, 497-98, Culver (No. 99CV161). After the judge granted the change of venue
motion, the class action was transferred to state court in Denver. Culver v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 02CV3487 (Dist. Ct. Denver County, Colo. filed Apr. 29,
2002). The 596 current or former Wal-Mart pharmacists who comprised the Colo-
rado class settled the lawsuit in 2003. See Cindy Rodriguez, Wal-Mart's Bargains
May Prove Costly, DENV. POST, Dec. 15, 2003, at B1.
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sociates ran in the local Trinidad market area.11 These commercials
dramatized a historical event that took place decades before just
outside Trinidad-the Ludlow Massacre.12 The commercials visually
and verbally described how mine workers and their family members
were killed in 1914 when the workers went on strike for better, fairer
pay and safer working conditions.1 3
Using a selection of historical black-and-white photographs, the
advertisements showed workers organizing and then being fired upon
by troops hired by, according to the commercials' narrative, "corporate
capital."14 Other visuals depicted the death and destruction that re-
sulted from the troops' setting fire to the workers' tent village where
women and children were hiding in holes under the tents that had
been dug to shield them from gunfire. In a transition to modern times,
slightly more than halfway through each thirty-second commercial,
the plaintiffs' attorneys-Frank Azar and John Barkely-were fea-
tured prominently as they spoke to the audience, giving what adver-
11. The advertisements ran 1,232 times in the Trinidad area between November 15,
2001 and December 30, 2001. The advertisements were carried on the Trinidad
cable television channels showing CNN, ESPN, Lifetime, and TNN. The Trini-
dad trial was scheduled to begin April 8, 2002. The judge scheduled to hear the
case recused himself. Judge Joseph Quinn was appointed to rule on the defend-
ants' motion for change of venue. Record at 499, Culver (No. 99CV161).
12. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home Grown Racism: Colorado's Historic
Embrace-and Denial-of Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 703, 789-90 (citations omitted):
[D]uring the coal boom in southern Colorado, in the period roughly from
1900 to 1915, company towns were built by the Colorado Fuel and Iron
Company, using a grid pattern that contrasted with earlier adjacent His-
panic settlements built around central plazas. These mining camps,
having no central gathering places, destroyed traditional Hispanic com-
munity, but, being relatively large, inadvertently provided an opportu-
nity for activism to develop. Workers, dissatisfied with or denied their
wages or paid in worthless scrip, and angered by extortionate prices at
the company store, struck. When the strike began, the company evicted
them from their homes in the camps, serving notice on the residents of
thirteen tent colonies located near the entrance to the mines. By 1914,
the United Mine Workers Union was providing financial support for
21,500 striking workers. Foreshadowing what was to come later when
Mexicans became surplus labor, Colorado sent its National Guard to
keep an eye on things. And on April 20, 1914, as happened earlier with
the Indians at Sand Creek, the troops opened fire with rifles and a ma-
chine gun on the colonies, many of whose residents (also perhaps recal-
ling what happened at Sand Creek) had dug trenches and cellars. But
the militia burned the tents, opened fire, and killed at least eighteen
workers in what has come to be known as the Ludlow Massacre. Massa-
cre victims included Mexicans, Italians, some Anglos, many other ethnic
miners, and children.
See also HOWARD M. GITELMAN, LEGACY OF THE LUDLOW MASSACRE: A CHAPTER IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY RELATIONS (1988) (discussing the consequences of the Lud-
low Massacre on the course of industrial relations).
13. Record at 6-7, 55, Culver (No. 99CV161).
14. Judge Quinn described the advertisements in his oral ruling. Id. at 499-500.
[Vol. 83:685
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tising experts refer to as "the call to action."15 The attorneys
admonished Trinidad residents to "never forget" their civic responsi-
bility to defend workers struggling for fair pay. One advertisement
closed with the attorneys standing in front of the Ludlow Massacre
memorial statue, located near Trinidad; the other ended with the at-
torneys standing in front of the Las Animas County courthouse where
the modern day trial was scheduled to be held.16
The question before the judge was whether the advertisements had
contaminated the jury pool in Trinidad and, further, whether the im-
pact of the commercials could be determined in voir dire,17 through
procedures commonly used to evaluate the impact of pretrial public-
ity.18 This case is particularly illustrative, because the commercials
15. See, e.g., WILLIAM WELLS, JOHN BURNETT & SANDRA MORIARTY, ADVERTISING:
PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE 335 (6th ed. 2003).
16. Record at 51-52, Culver (No. 99CV161).
17. One trial judge translates "voir dire" from the French as meaning "to see, to
speak." Tom M. Dees, III, Juries: On the Verge of Extinction? A Discussion of
Jury Reform, 54 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1763 (2001) (citing John McClellan Marshall,
Free From Any Bias or Prejudice: Voir Dire, 6 VoIR DIRE 20 (Fall 1999)). That is,
voir dire-questioning the jury pool to avoid seating biased or otherwise unquali-
fied jurors-allows attorneys to see and talk with prospective jurors, determining
if any of them already have made up their minds. Id. Dees also notes that
Black's Law Dictionary defines voir dire as "to speak the truth." Id. (citing
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1569 (7th ed. 1999)). For a detailed discussion on the
merits of the voir dire process see S. Mac Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir
Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 290 (1972-1973).
18. The judge based his ruling for a change in venue on the advertisements' effects on
potential jurors:
Las Animas County has a population of 15,207 persons of which
9,078, or 60 percent, live in Trinidad. There are 4,500 homes in Trinidad
and about 80 percent, or 3,600 of these homes, subscribe to cable TV....
I find that the Ludlow ads had a very high frequency-that is, the
number of times the viewer was exposed to the ads-and there was also
a very high recall by viewers exposed to the ads. [Sixty-three] percent of
those persons who viewed the ads were able to recall that Mr. Azar spon-
sored the ads, and . . . I find about 40 percent of those persons who
viewed the ads were likely to have been influenced by the Ludlow ads in
favor of the plaintiffs .... [Forty-four] percent of those persons who
viewed the Ludlow ads had a more favorable view of Mr. Azar than
before viewing the ads, and 32 percent of those who viewed the ads had a
more favorable view of Mr. Barclay than they had before viewing the
ads.
Record at 500-02, Culver (No. 99CV161). The judge also noted the impact of Wal-
Mart's corporate advertising, including those featuring "Wal-Mart's support for
the African-American book club and African-American heritage and clean drink-
ing water and missing children and handicapped children, and also an ad empha-
sizing the fact that Wal-Mart's employees appear to be very happy with their
work." Id. at 502-03. Judge Quinn concluded:
[Tihe Ludlow ads by the Azar law firm have resulted in the plaintiffs
acquiring an undue influence over the attitudes and mindset of many of
the inhabitants of Las Animas County who viewed the ads on television.
... The natural and probable [effect] of the ads on a jury panel will be to
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used were not typical pretrial publicity in which either the defendant
or plaintiff is discussed. Rather, in these commercials neither the
pharmacists nor Wal-Mart was mentioned. Thus, determining the ef-
fects of the commercials on the jury pool required an entirely different
understanding of message impact than that of the traditional tests to
determine the impact of pretrial publicity.
Advertisements are meant to accomplish precisely what judges
want to prevent-influencing decisions, usually at some later point in
time when a consumer is considering a purchase. Creators of adver-
tisements, like trial lawyers, have the ability, when they want to use
it, to "deceiv[e] one's listeners or readers with partial truths."19 When
advertisements lead to decisions about what cola or laundry detergent
to purchase, advertising is a useful tool in a capitalistic society. How-
ever, when advertisements influence decisions about a defendant's
guilt or innocence, or which party wins a lawsuit, advertising can un-
dermine a democratic society.
Democracy and the United States Constitution demand public con-
fidence in fair jury decisions. 20 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution requires that juries in criminal trials be "impartial,"2 1
the Fifth Amendment ensures that criminal defendants be given "due
process of law,"2 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens
"due process of law."2 3 A fair trial, secured by these constitutional
protections, is among the "most fundamental of all freedoms,"2 4 the
create a link, whether subconsciously or consciously, between Mr. Azar
and Mr. Barclay on one hand, and the very same rights to fair pay for
employees that precipitated the Ludlow Massacre. This link .. .will
result in predisposing a substantial number of potential jurors to favora-
bly view the cause of the employees seeking fair pay from their employer
as the plaintiffs are seeking in this case....
I am convinced that the effect of the Ludlow ads has created a bias,
whether conscious or subconscious, on the part of viewers in favor of
plaintiff employees seeking fair pay against their employer .... In light
of the limited population of Las Animas County and extensive penetra-
tion of the Ludlow ads, selecting a fair and impartial jury in Las Animas
County would be extremely difficult and a risky task at the very best.
Id. at 505-07.
19. George Fisher, The O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV. 971, 990 (1997).
20. See Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Prior Restraints on the Media and the Right to a
Fair Trial: A Proposal for a New Standard, 84 Ky. L.J. 259, 262-64 (1996) (Press
coverage "helps make government institutions more accountable," including
courts, being "an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power which en-
hances the quality and integrity of the process, with benefits to both the defen-
dant and society as a whole.").
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. Id. amend. V.
23. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
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Supreme Court has said, and is necessary for "the preservation and
enjoyment of all other rights."25
However, the First Amendment's protection for "the freedom of
speech [and] of the press" 26 may conflict with the Sixth Amendment's
stated guarantees 2 7 and the Seventh Amendment's implied assur-
ances of a fair civil trial.28 News stories and editorials in print and
electronic media reveal information that might not be presented at
trial, including defendants' confessions, past criminal histories, and
polygraph test results. 29 Appellate courts have overturned some jury
decisions due to inflammatory publicity. 30 Despite earlier justices'
concern about pretrial news coverage, 3 1 the U.S. Supreme Court re-
cently has made it more difficult for defendants to show that media
coverage prejudiced their trials.32
Part II of this Article uses communication theory to discuss the
ways in which advertisements may affect jurors and potential jurors.
Part III summarizes historical and contemporary court decisions in-
25. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586 (1976) (Brennan, J., with Stewart &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in judgment).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. Id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ").
28. Id. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved... [and jury decisions will be reviewed only] according to the rules of
the common law.").
29. Most common law countries, other than the United States, make clear that the
media may not publish such prejudicial information. See generally Michael Ches-
terman, OJ and the Dingo: How Media Publicity Relating to Criminal Cases
Tried by Jury Is Dealt With in Australia and America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 109,
116 (1997) (Australia "gives primacy.., to the fairness of trials as against claims
of the media .. .for freedom of speech," and applies "deterrence through penal
sanctions ... for publishing material which threatens to prejudice the fairness of
a current or forthcoming criminal trial."); Joanne Armstrong Brandwood, Note,
You Say "Fair Trial" and I Say "Free Press": British and American Approaches to
Protecting Defendants' Rights in High Profile Trials, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1412,
1431 (2000) (English courts see prejudicial publicity, particularly publishing con-
fessions and prior criminal records, as inimical to fair trials, will stop trials ad-
versely affected by prejudicial publicity, and may impose strict limits on
publishing information about pending cases, enforceable by contempt).
30. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
31. See, e.g., Irvin, 366 U.S. at 729-30 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("How can fallible
men and women reach a disinterested verdict based exclusively on what they
heard in court when, before they enter the jury box, their minds were saturated
by press and radio for months preceding by matter designed to establish the guilt
of the accused?").
32. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (affirming a Virginia Supreme Court
ruling that there was no violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury or Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because the
judge refused to question prospective jurors about their exposure to specific news
reports).
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volving prejudicial publicity in criminal and civil cases, including re-
search investigating juror bias. Part IV examines means of limiting or
proscribing case-related advertisements that have a potential to cause
juror prejudice, including judges issuing restrictive orders restraining
attorneys' speech, applying the commercial speech doctrine, and using
voir dire to identify biased jurors. Part V concludes that the U.S. Su-
preme Court's Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada3 3 decision gives judges
the power to stop attorneys from publishing case-related advertise-
ments, that the commercial speech doctrine is not applicable to such
situations, and that voir dire may not be an effective method of
preventing jury decisions that have been influenced unfairly by
advertisements.
II. ADVERTISING'S EFFECTS ON JURORS
News story effects are primarily cognitive-i.e., focused on knowl-
edge-and can be evaluated with survey research. 34 In some cases,
the news also may affect attitudes. Although it is more difficult to
determine a message's effect on attitude change, it is possible to do so
with a carefully designed survey that compares the population in the
jury pool with a control population uncontaminated by the news cover-
age. Cognitive message strategies are referred to in consumer behav-
ior theory as the central route to persuasion 35 and occasionally are
used in advertising, particularly when there is news to announce or a
product feature to explain.
A. How Advertising May Influence Jurors
Advertising may deliver cognitive impact, although the impact of
advertising is more likely to be found in emotions and associations,
particularly when the message is dominated by visuals.36 In contrast
to the central route, this affective approach is referred to as the pe-
ripheral approach to persuasion.3 7 With the peripheral route, impres-
sions are formed at the margins of thought and are largely
33. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (holding that the trial judge may impose a restrictive order
banning extrajudicial statements reasonably likely to cause an unfair trial).
34. See, e.g., Silvia Knobloch et al., Effects of Salience Dimensions of Informational
Utility on Selective Exposure to Online News, 80 JouRNALisM Q. 91 (2003)
(describing results of a study conducted to test the effect that manipulation of
salience dimensions has on online newsmagazine readers).
35. See generally Richard E. Petty et al., Central and Peripheral Routes to Advertis-
ing Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Involvement, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 135
(1983).
36. See generally ANN MARIE BARRY, VISUAL INTELLIGENCE: PERCEPTION, IMAGE, AND
MANIPULATION IN VISUAL COMMUNICATION 253-55 (1997) (discussing how the con-
cept of visual intelligence in advertising affects the viewer's emotions and
associations).
37. See id.
[Vol. 83:685
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unreasoned. How a person feels about a favorite beverage, for exam-
ple, is not the product of a rational assessment, but rather a result of
images presented through advertising combined with personal exper-
iences drinking the beverage. The tools of the peripheral route strat-
egy include emotional appeals, associations, images, likeability,
lifestyle cues, and links to celebrities. Most brand image and emo-
tional advertising strategies are designed to stimulate peripheral
processing, a theory explained in the Elaboration Likelihood Model
("ELM"),38 which leads to a state of involvement with the message
that is largely beyond measure. At least, there are no good tests of
involvement that might be useful to evaluate this element of periph-
eral processing. 39
Furthermore, advertising, with the exception of direct-response ad-
vertising, is designed to generate a delayed response-that is, at some
point in the future when the right cues are in place they will stimulate
the desired response, such as buying a product or voting for a candi-
date. Brand advertising exemplifies this: When a television viewer
sees an advertisement for McDonald's, the viewer probably will not
immediately drive to a McDonald's restaurant and order a hamburger.
However, McDonald's advertises so that, at some time in the future
when the viewer is hungry and considering choices to assuage that
hunger, the viewer will consider McDonald's. The advertising strat-
egy is that the emotional impact of the McDonald's advertisements
will linger and motivate the viewer to move from considering possible
options-called the "evoked set"4o- to choosing McDonald's.
The Ludlow Massacre commercials involved both central and pe-
ripheral processing. Typically, the cognitive task viewers face is to
understand the historical narrative. However, there is also impact at
the peripheral, emotional level. This is where these commercials be-
come problematic for jurists, because this impact is difficult to uncover
using traditional pretrial publicity methodologies.
No social science studies about media publicity and juror bias have
examined the impact of advertisements. However, research about ad-
vertising in other contexts supports the argument that advertise-
ments are able to create as much, if not more, bias among jurors as are
news stories.
38. John T. Cacioppo et al., Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion: An Individ-
ual Difference Perspective, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1032 (1986).
39. See Lynda L. Kaid, Political Advertising, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICA-
TION 249 (Dan R. Nimmo & Keith R. Sanders eds., 1981); John L. Lastovicka &
D.M. Gardner, Components of Involvement, in ATTITUDE RESEARCH PLAYS FOR
HIGH STAKES 53 (John C. Maloney & Bernard Silverman eds., 1980).
40. J. PAUL PETER & JERRY C. OLSON, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND MARKETING STRAT-
EGY 156 (1999).
20051
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1. Association
The impact of most advertising lies in the area in which people
learn about a product or brand in a largely noncognitive, even nonra-
tional way, through associations and feelings. To understand this,
consider the two basic types of learning theories-cognitive and condi-
tioned learning-and how they apply to advertising and marketing
strategy. Cognitive learning is based on a presentation of facts, expla-
nations, and arguments leading to understanding. This is the same
theory that was referred to earlier as the central route to learning
used by news stories.
Conditioned learning, on the other hand, is created by linking one
thing with another, creating an association that is learned through
repetition. In the famous Pavlovian experiment that led to the devel-
opment of the theory of conditioned learning, the dog learned through
repetition to associate food with a bell.41 Research has found that
when emotions and feelings are also part of the association, they
strengthen the learning and lock the association in memory, and those
same feelings can serve as a cue to reactivate the message from mem-
ory.4 2 Although advertising messages sometimes use a cognitive
strategy, they frequently are designed to enhance associations and af-
fective responses. Advertising scholar Ivan Preston has developed the
Association Model of Advertising to explain how this critical process
drives advertising.43
In other words, a paired association is the strategy behind adver-
tising that seeks to equate a brand with a positive experience, such as
a particular soft drink with teenage fun, or a brand of cigarettes with
the independence of a cowboy and the West. People learn these as-
sociations from advertising and other marketing communication
sources. 44 But people largely are unaware of how the associations are
acquired and to what extent they are embedded in their minds. 45 Fur-
41. For a description of the Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov's experiments regard-
ing dogs conditioned to salivate when a bell is rung because of their association of
the ringing bell with food, see, for example, Camille A. Nelson, Carriers of Global-
ization: Loss of Home and Self Within the African Diaspora, 55 FLA. L. REV. 539,
551 n.36 (2003).
42. See Thomas J. Page, Jr. et al., The Memory Impact of Commercials Varying in
Emotional Appeal and Product Involvement, in EMOTION IN ADVERTISING 255,
supra note 6.
43. See Ivan Preston, The Association Model of the Advertising Communication Pro-
cess, 11 J. ADVERTISING 3 (1982).
44. See GIEP FRANZEN & MARGOT BouwmA, THE MENTAL WORLD OF BRANDS 101-05
(2001); Cees Goossens, Visual Persuasion: Mental Imagery Processing and Emo-
tional Experiences, in PERSUASIVE IMAGERY: A CONSUMER RESPONSE PERSPECTIVE
129, 135 (Linda Scott & Rajeev Batra eds., 2003) [hereinafter PERSUASIVE
IMAGERY].
45. See BARRY, supra note 36, at 21-22; Christie L. Nordhielm, A Levels-of-Processing
Model of Advertising Repetition Effects, in PERSUASIVE IMAGERY 98, supra note
[Vol. 83:685
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thermore, if consumers were asked about such associations, they
might not even be able to verbalize the connections that were created.
This is because the connections are independent of cognitive, rational
awareness, and because association works at the subconscious level.
For these reasons, traditional survey research and the voir dire
processes are inadequate to determine the effect on a jury pool of is-
sue-related pretrial advertising.
In Preston's association model of advertising, the end result of ef-
fective advertising is impression formation, or what he calls an "inte-
grated perception."4 6 Impression formation is formally defined as how
people integrate and combine information. 47 The most common exam-
ple of an integrated perception is the brand image created for Marl-
boro and embodied in the figure of the rugged, independent cowboy.
48
If advertising successfully creates an impression such as this, its effec-
tiveness would need to be measured by image studies, not recall or
attitude change. The reality, however, is that advertising often is
mixed with other marketing communication, as well as personal ex-
periences and word-of-mouth communication. Therefore, the message
impact does not come together to create Preston's "integrated percep-
tion" until the consumer is in a store making a product-buying deci-
sion, or in a voting booth, or in some other situation that stimulates
the consumer's response.
2. Networks of Associations
This untidy "deep structure" of associations must be evaluated to
determine whether pretrial advertising can effectively contaminate a
jury pool. People's minds are a messy stew of feelings, ideas, memo-
ries, opinions, emotions, and facts. All these fragments come together
at some point to create an impression and, perhaps, a judgment. This
happens through a process known as "spreading activation," in which
any cue from within the set of associations can activate the entire net-
work.4 9 Thinking of McDonald's, for example, may create a network
of associations including inexpensive but dependable quality food,
children's playgrounds, fast food ordering counters, drive-through
windows, hamburgers, and the Ronald McDonald House, among other
thoughts. Various combinations of these associations may lead to an
impression of McDonald's as cheap food, a place for families, or a good
44; Piotr Winkielman et al., Cognitive and Affective Consequences of Visual Flu-
ency: When Seeing Is Easy on the Mind, in PERSUASIVE IMAGERY 80, supra note
44.
46. Preston, supra note 43, at 4, 6.
47. Michael S. Nmulvey & Carmen Medina, Invoking the Rhetorical Power of Charac-
ter to Create Identifications, in PERSUASIVE IMAGERY 225, supra note 44.
48. See MARIEKE DE Mooij, ADVERTISING WORLDWIDE 94, 233 (2d ed. 1994).
49. John R. Anderson, A Spreading Activation Theory of Memory, 22 J. VERBAL
LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 261, 261 (1983).
2005]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
corporate citizen. The way thoughts spread from one to another of
these associations happens largely without any conscious effort.
In the example of the Ludlow Massacre, the story line in the adver-
tisements used the familiar "good guy/bad guy" schema,50 with the
workers being the "good guys" and the large corporation being the
"bad guys." The historical workers are clearly and sympathetically de-
picted in the commercials, but the unnamed company is only repre-
sented by the troops firing their guns on the workers, along with the
phrase "corporate capital." (In fact, the unnamed big business in the
Ludlow Massacre incident was John D. Rockefeller, Jr.'s Colorado
Fuel and Iron Company.51) Because the commercials provided a
strong association of attorneys Azar and Barclay with the Ludlow
Massacre and the present day plight of workers in the "good guys/bad
guys" dichotomy, these associations likely could exist as links within
viewers' memory networks.
Advertising researchers, particularly account planners who use a
variety of qualitative probing research methods, are able to sort
through this mental stew to derive insight about the association net-
works and use these insights in the development of advertising strate-
gies. 52 Such methods are qualitative, imprecise, and rarely supported
with numerically-based facts, so judges might be uncomfortable ad-
mitting such conclusions into a court of law. Unfortunately, that asso-
ciation network is where the impact of advertising lies, and it must be
assessed with some tool more informative than a survey, as surveys
merely scratch the surface of the knowledge structure, but fail to as-
sess the associations, emotions, and impressions.
3. Framing and Schemas
The implied pairing through association of corporate capital ("bad
guys") and striking workers ("good guys") also set up the frame, or pre-
formed semantic pattern of response, 5 3 to be used in the class action
against Wal-Mart, i.e., having jurors unconsciously associating the
company defendant as the "bad guy" and the workers as the "good
guys." It is an easy association to make and calls for the Trinidad
viewers of the commercials to start filling in the blanks in the "good
guys/bad guys" schema when given appropriate cues by the plaintiffs
50. Schemas are a shortcut form of information processing that rely on previously
understood patterns as prototypes or generalized knowledge structures. See
FRANZEN & BouwMAN, supra note 44, at 95-99; Goossens, supra note 44, at 132.
51. Cf James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 1015
(1997).
52. For an instructive guide on how to develop successful advertising through various
customer research methods, see LISA FORTINI-CAMPBELL, HITTING THE SWEET
SPOT (1992).
53. See generally Lawrence W. Barsalou, Context-Independent and Context-Depen-
dent Information in Concepts, 10 MEMORY & COGNITION 82 (1982).
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attorney. In other words, after something has made an impression
(i.e., it achieved a level of awareness) and is stored in memory, there is
an increased probability that it and associated thoughts and feelings
will come to mind when an appropriate cue is presented. In the Wal-
Mart situation, the framing of the message could lead the viewers of
the commercials to think of attorneys Azar and Barclay as protectors
of workers' rights-the "good guys" battling the evils of corporate
capital.
4. The Cueing Process
The effect of advertising framing and priming, then, is not necessa-
rily to spur recall or attitude change, results likely from exposure to
news stories. Rather, framing and priming create a cueing process
that brings associations and feelings to the mind's surface and creates
impressions. 54 Cues spur a thought or advance an argument by creat-
ing memory links to pre-set associations. This mental filling-in is a
routine perceptual process, not a sign that we are all automatons.
One scholar has stated: "Our minds become engaged by a calculated
suggestiveness . . .[and] we respond to the invitation to complete a
train of thought."5 5
That is what happens as the phrase "corporate capital," with all its
associated meanings and implications, moves from the original un-
named big business in the historical Ludlow Massacre (the Colorado
Coal and Steel Company) to Wal-Mart. The phrase is a trigger that
carries a set of emotionally loaded associations. But the phrase also is
deliberately framed as an open marker in order to make it easier for
jurors to fill in the blank without having to first unload the Rockefel-
ler company, with all its baggage, from the syllogism.
In other words, pretrial issue-related advertising seeks to frame
the issue so that the message response is largely below the level of
awareness and located in a network of associations. The associations
can be designed to frame an issue in such a way that, during the trial,
the jurors are pre-set to fill in the blanks when given the appropriate
cues.
5. Priming and Closure
Advertising uses other indirect means of communication that lead
to the fill-in-the-blank response. Similar to framing, priming means
that one thought ignites a related thought; it serves as a trigger.
56
54. See TiJs TIMMERMAN, RESEARCHING BRAND IMAGES: THE NATURE AND ACTIVATION
OF BRAND REPRESENTATION IN MEMORY 89-90 (2001).
55. PAUL MESSARIS, VISUAL PERSUASION: THE ROLE OF IMAGES IN ADVERTISING 168
(1997).
56. See generally Leonard Berkowitz & Karen Heimer Rogers, A Priming Effect Anal-
ysis of Media Influences, in PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA EFFECTS 57 (Jennings Bryant
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For example, the word "McDonald's" is a trigger that leads to thoughts
about hamburgers and French fries, because advertising and personal
experience tie together these products. Consider that while eating
hamburgers and French fries in a McDonald's an earthquake tremor
rumbles through the building. Very likely, and for a long time after,
whenever thinking about hamburgers and French fries, or about Mc-
Donald's, an earthquake will also come to mind. Similarly, whenever
thinking about an earthquake, McDonald's will come to mind. These
conditioned associations have been given relevance through personal
experience. In the same way, when Trinidad residents who saw the
Ludlow Massacre commercials see the attorneys in the courtroom and
hear references to fair pay, they will have been primed to think of
workers as victims of big companies and of the attorneys as defenders
of the worker-victims.
Filling in the blanks is also referred to as "closure,"57 which means
people have a tendency to complete a thought. A classic advertising
campaign for Salem cigarettes demonstrates how this principle is used
in advertising. The campaign jingle said: "You can take Salem out of
the country, but you can't take the country out of Salem." After hear-
ing this line many times, the jingle closes with: "You can take Salem
out of the country, but . . ." Listeners were invited to finish the
thought.58 In the case of the Ludlow Massacre commercials, closure
was being used to help jurors make the connection between the un-
named big company, the "bad guys" in the metaphor, and the pharma-
cists' case against Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart is not mentioned in the
commercials, but the phrase "corporate capital" is a blank marker and
its use in the trial would invite jurors to complete the thought-to fill
in the blank-by making the obvious link to Wal-Mart.
6. Elaboration
But can advertising set up such an unstated link? An example of
how this indirect communication works comes from a commercial idea
tested for Bar S Bacon. Viewers were shown a simple commercial
with bacon frying in an iron skillet. When viewers were asked to "play
back" the commercial in their own words, they added cowboys, horses,
boots, light flickering on faces, eagles, mountains, and streams. None
of these images were in the commercial being tested, but the viewers
built the rest of the story from the simple cue of bacon frying in a
& DolfZillmann eds., 1986); Nordhielm, supra note 45, at 97; Winkielman et. al.,
supra note 45, at 84.
57. MICHAEL R. SOLOMON, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 55-57 (1992).
58. The commercial is described in Sandra E. Moriarty & Shay Sayre, Visual Semio-
tics and the Production of Meaning in Advertising, Presentation at Association
for Journalism & Mass Communication (Aug. 12, 1995) (available in the Schmid
Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law).
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skillet over a campfire. 5 9 This concept of elaboration is part of the
theory derived from the Elaboration Likelihood Model6O and is used to
help explain how personal involvement extends the persuasive power
of peripheral processing.
Another example of making a link from an unstated comparison is
the classic "1984" commercial used to launch the Apple Macintosh
computer, and, at the same time, negatively reposition its competitor
IBM. The commercial, based on George Orwell's novel, 1984,61 was
largely nonverbal with only an oblique tag line at the end: "On Janu-
ary 24, 1984 won't be like 1984."62 The central message was the
launch of a new user-friendly computer, but the peripheral message
was that Apple was a liberator and IBM was Big Brother representing
a rigid, unfriendly system. An analysis of the intended and perceived
messages in this commercial found that forty-four percent of viewers
got the competitive message even though it was delivered nonverbally
through a complex metaphoric narrative. 63
It would not be unexpected, then, to find that the framing of the
Ludlow Massacre commercials might lead viewers to make the associ-
ational leap from the unnamed "corporate capital," the bad guys in the
historical event, to Wal-Mart, the biggest company in the world. Such
communication shortcuts are common in advertising.
7. Emotion and Memory
Another aspect of advertising that is different from most news sto-
ries is its deliberate use of emotion as a message strategy to engage
the audience and anchor the communication in memory. In advertis-
ing, strategists speak of finding the "hot buttons" that add an emo-
tional loading to a message. For example, the Ludlow Massacre
commercials vividly presented the horror of the shooting of the miners
and the deaths of their families who were killed when the troops set
fire to their tents. The historical part of the commercials was de-
signed to create a high level of emotional response in viewers.
In addition to the potency of emotional messages, this affective di-
mension is powerful, because emotionally loaded cues drive the re-
trieval of previously stored impressions. Studies have found that
emotional commercials are more likely to be recalled than neutral
59. See supra note 58.
60. For a general framework of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion, see
John T. Cacioppo et al., Processes of Social Influence: The Elaboration Likelihood
Model of Persuasion, in 4 ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH AND
THERAPY 215 (Philip C. Kendall ed., 1985).
61. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948).
62. See Moriarty & Sayre, supra note 58.
63. Id.
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ones, and they activate emotionally charged memories. 6 4 Esther
Thorson's memory model of advertising posits that commercials are
stored in memory as episodic traces that contain key elements of the
commercial as well as background elements, such as the feelings elic-
ited by the commercial. 6 5 The way memory for advertising works, ac-
cording to this model, is that any one of these elements, including the
feelings elicited by the advertisement, can serve as a cue to reactivate
the entire message and its meaning. That is what allows viewers "to
remember" the advertisement.
Thorson also has determined that when people are involved in
making judgments as part of the processing of the advertisement, they
are more likely to retrieve the judgment than to recall the informa-
tion.66 In the case of the Ludlow Massacre advertisements, viewers
were engaged in making the "good guy/bad guy" judgment as they
watched the commercials. That adds an additional emotional loading
to their association network beyond just the horrible events depicted
in the historical parts of the commercials. According to Thorson's re-
search, the Ludlow Massacre viewers very well may retrieve the judg-
ment-"good guys" equal workers, "bad guys" equal big companies-
detached from the specific commercials that encoded the judgments.
That is another problem for attorneys and judges in voir dire: Are po-
tential jurors being dishonest when saying they can set aside exposure
to pretrial issue-related advertising, or do they simply not know the
many ways such advertising has affected their views of the case?
8. The Relevance Factor
Another dimension of an individual's memory of an advertisement
is relevance. Something that connects on a personal level with a
viewer has resonance-it strikes a chord-and that serves as an
anchor in memory. 6 7 The "good guy/bad guy" metaphor is a familiar
narrative technique. However, in the Ludlow Massacre commercials
it was given even more emotional loading through the local connection
to the historical event. The town of Trinidad still has descendants of
the workers living in the community and continues to memorialize the
64. For a discussion of the benefits of using emotion in news and advertising, see
Maxwell McCombs & Sheldon Gilbert, News Influence on Our Pictures of the
World, in PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA EFFECTS 1, supra note 56; Ronald W. Pimentel
& Susan E. Heckler, Changes in Logo Designs: Chasing the Elusive Butterfly
Curve, in PERSUASIVE IMAGERY 105, supra note 44, at 106-07.
65. See Page, Jr. et al., supra note 42, at 256.
66. See id.
67. See generally Punam Anand & Brian Sternthatl, Strategies for Designing Persua-
sive Messages: Deductions from the Resource Matching Hypothesis, in COGNITIVE
AND AFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO ADVERTISING, supra note 6 (providing both a de-
tailed analysis of the importance of relevance to advertising and various strate-
gies for the use of relevance to create more effective advertisements).
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event, not just with the Ludlow Massacre memorial, but also with
community events.
In the case of the Ludlow Massacre commercials, the mix of emo-
tions includes horror over the shooting and the unfairness of the ac-
tions against workers and their families, plus a good/bad judgment
about the participants. All of that is enhanced by a personally rele-
vant tradition within the local community. These commercials were a
mix designed to ignite feelings.
B. Assessing the Impact of Peripherally Processed
Advertisements
Will it be effective for a judge simply to ask potential jurors if they
remember the advertisements? 68 The problem with advertising im-
pact is that it is not just about recall. Recipients of advertising
messages may be able to recall seeing the commercials, but the impact
of the viewing on their association network and judgments may be be-
yond their ability to verbalize. Indeed, it is possible for a judge to ask
potential jurors if they saw certain advertisements and find that the
viewers are unable to recall seeing the advertisements-even when, in
fact, they did. Advertising tends to "wash over" people with little ef-
fect at the level of awareness, although the peripheral processing may
leave behind any number of fragmented impressions. 6 9 Because most
people have defenses against advertising, they may not wish to recall
advertisements that they actually have seen and noted but put out of
their minds.70
Would it be effective for the judge to instruct potential jurors to set
aside their impressions formed by the advertisements and make deci-
sions based only on what they see and hear in the courtroom? Unfor-
tunately, a judge's statement may only start the retrieval process.
Those who say they saw the advertisements may not remember the
full story, but bits and pieces may come back during the trial, particu-
68. The Supreme Court has ruled that a trial judge may ask jurors questions about
specific media materials to which they have been exposed, but that there is no
constitutional requirement that a judge do so. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415 (1991).
69. Stewart Shapiro et al., Measuring and Assessing the Impact of Preattentive
Processing on Ad and Brand Attitudes, in MEASURING ADVERTISING EFFECTIVE-
NESS 27 (William D. Wells ed., 1997).
70. For a description of various studies revealing television commercial avoidance
measures utilized by television viewers, see, for example, Avery M. Abernethy,
Physical and Mechanical Avoidance of Television Commercials, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 1991 CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ADVERTISING 223 (Re-
becca Holman ed., 1991); Sandra Moriarty & Shu-Ling Everett, Commercial
Breaks: A Viewing Behavior Study, 71 JOURNALISM Q. 346 (1994); Paul S. Speck
& Michael T. Elliott, Predictors of Advertising Avoidance in Print and Broadcast
Media, 26 J. ADVERTISING 61 (1997).
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larly if there are key phrases and images that cue emotional responses
and judgments being used during the trial. The judge's admonition
may be only the first step in a complex retrieval process-and so
charging the jury could contribute in its own way to priming the re-
sponses of potential jurors.
C. Advertising's Dependence on Context
Impressions gleaned from an advertisement may be difficult to ar-
ticulate, because they are largely unformed until a situation and a cue
provide the impetus for further impression formation. Most advertis-
ing is designed to trigger a response or behavior at some point in the
future when a consumer is making a product or service choice. In
other words, the impact of advertising is context-based and the moti-
vation to make a purchase stimulates the impression formation pro-
cess. Likewise, pretrial issue-related advertising may come together
at some later time (e.g., during the trial) when the appropriate trig-
gers are used.
With pretrial issue-related advertising, the situation is likely to be
the courtroom, but the cues will vary with the issue and the skill of the
attorney in framing the case. Researchers investigating contamina-
tion must ask what the cues are that might trigger an impression and
bring it to the surface. In the Ludlow Massacre example, the cues
were references to the historical massacre, but also to fair pay and
workers' rights, issues at the heart of the contemporary message being
delivered by the attorneys in their "never forget" call to action. In this
instance, it would be impossible to try the case without referring to
workers' rights and fair pay, so the cues are deeply entrenched in the
courtroom argument. Another cue would be the courtroom itself, since
the courthouse played a prominent role in the closing of one of the
advertisements.
Finally, and most importantly, the two lawyers who were featured
in the advertisements are themselves cues when they take on their
role as the plaintiffs' advocates. The impression created by the Lud-
low Massacre advertisements, through their associational structure,
frames the attorneys as defenders of workers' rights and on the side of
the "good guys," the defenseless workers being victimized by the big
company. By implication, and without saying a word about the defen-
dant, Wal-Mart becomes the "bad guy" in this scenario. Messaris re-
fers to this aspect of advertising as "showing the unspoken."71 The
association is nearly inescapable as the jurors find it difficult to avoid
filling in the blank in the "good guy/bad guy" syllogism. The presence
of the two attorneys brings the "good guy/bad guy" story back to the
71. MESSARIS, supra note 55, at 223-24.
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surface of the jurors' minds, but not until the jurors are already part of
the trial process and the attorneys start to use the cue words.
The foregoing analysis is supported by the work of British cultural
studies scholar Judith Williamson. In analyzing the effects of adver-
tising, Williamson notes that the syntax of visuals-how they are
linked-can make the connection between two unrelated entities ap-
pear natural, something that viewers may take for granted without
questioning too deeply. She observes that "[tihe use of visual syntax
to lessen the obtrusiveness of controversial claims is a convention with
a long history in U.S. advertising."72
III. DEFINING JUROR BIAS
A. Fair Juror Standards in Criminal Trials
The concern about attorney-placed advertising relating to cases in
which the attorney represents a client is based upon the constitutional
requirement of having a fair jury. A fair juror is the goal in criminal
and civil trials-a juror who decides based on what she or he sees and
hears in court, not on media reports and gossip. 73 Justice Holmes
wrote in the case of Patterson v. Colorado, "the theory of our system is
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influ-
ence, whether of private talk or public print."74 In Patterson, the
Court upheld a trial judge's right to impose contempt citations on me-
dia whose coverage tended to interfere with a fair trial.75
The United States has been struggling for nearly 200 years with
the question of what constitutes a "fair" juror.76 The question has
largely focused on criminal trials, and the issue emerges anew with
72. Id. at 224 (quoting JUDITH WILLIAMSON, DECODING ADVERTISEMENTS: IDEOLOGY
AND MEANING IN ADVERTISING (1978)).
73. Justice William 0. Douglas was prescient forty years ago in stating: "Imagine
what could happen if the latent local passions were aroused through channels
provided by radio and television. Then there might be no place to which the trial
could be transferred to protect the accused." Justice William 0. Douglas, The
Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 RocKY MTN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1960), quoted in
John A. Walton, From O.J. to Tim McVeigh and Beyond: The Supreme Court's
Totality of Circumstances Test as Ringmaster in the Expanding Media Circus, 75
DENV. U. L. REV. 549, 549 (1998).
74. 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
75. Id. at 463. See also Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 421
(1918), overruled by Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941). In Toledo
Newspaper, the Court affirmed a trial judge's ability to hold a newspaper in con-
tempt on grounds that the newspaper's coverage of the case had a "reasonable
tendency" to cause an unfair trial.
76. See Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of
Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 639 ("Beginning in the early days of the
republic, . . . American courts began to struggle with the issue of whether expo-
sure to media coverage biases potential jurors.").
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each "crime of the century." The United States has experienced many
trials of defendants accused of heinous crimes77-from Aaron Burr's
treason trial in 1807,78 to Harry Thaw's murder trials in the first dec-
ade of the twentieth century, 79 through O.J. Simpson's murder trial,80
and beyond.
England, from which this country took much of its law, had a clear
definition of "fair juror"-a person who knew the parties and was fa-
miliar with the issues.8 1 For example, twelve hundred years ago in a
case involving a disagreement over land, thirty-six people-one-half
being friends of one party, the other half being friends of the opposing
party-were asked to make a ruling.8 2 Several centuries later, the
Magna Carta entrenched the belief that people should be judged by
their peers: "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or ... outlawed
or exiled or in any way ruined ... except by lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land."8 3
Rather than seeking jurors who were well conversant with the
facts and knew the parties in a case, as did early English courts,8 4
American judges recognized that exposure to information could create
biased jurors.8 5 However, American courts also held that mere knowl-
edge was not tantamount to bias.86 This view was expressed in the
77. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, Cases of the Century, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 585
(2000) (describing high-profile twentieth-century American cases and their effect
on society).
78. See John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and
Presidential Power, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1435, 1439 ("If the O.J. Simpson trial was
the trial of this [twentieth] century, then the Aaron Burr case was the trial of the
last (nineteenth century.").
79. See Levenson, supra note 77, at 588-89.
80. See Fisher, supra note 19 (reviewing eight books about the O.J. Simpson murder
trial).
81. For background on the development of the jury system in England, see Phoebe A.
Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 34-40 (1994).
82. Minow & Cate, supra note 76, at 638 (citing WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL
BY JURY 59-60 (2d ed. 1971)). In this case, Alfnoth claimed he owned land on
which a monastery stood. The thirty-six panel members sided with the monks,
and also ordered Alfnoth to cede his land to the King in compensation for
Alfnoth's false claim. Id.
83. MAGNA CARTA § 39 (1215), quoted in David A. Salansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (2002) (citing
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 326-27 (J.C. Holt trans., 1965)).
84. See LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JuRY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 39 (1973)
("If it developed that the jurors testified under oath that they were unacquainted
with the facts, other jurors were summoned until there were 12 who had knowl-
edge and who agreed.").
85. Currently, state trial judges are instructed not to seat jurors who acknowledge
having personal knowledge about the case, the particular issues in dispute, or the
parties involved. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, AM. BAR ASS'N &
NAT'L JUDICIAL COLL., THE JUDGE'S BOOK 210-11 (2d ed. 1994).
86. Mark Twain had a somewhat different view of a fair juror: "We have a criminal
jury system which is superior to any in the world; and its efficiency is only
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1807 Aaron Burr treason trial.8 7 Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting
as trial judge in the Burr case and aware of President Thomas Jeffer-
son's publicized declaration of Burr's guilt, wrote that it would be best
to have jurors with "perfect freedom from previous impression."8 8 But
realizing the impracticability of that test, Marshall, rejecting Burr's
contention that only people who knew nothing about the case could
fairly judge him,89 said that fair jurors are those "who will fairly hear
the testimony which may be offered to them."90
Confirming this standard, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1878 said
that "a juror who has formed an opinion [based on media exposure
before trial] cannot be impartial."9 1 In that case, however, the Court
held that the presence on a jury of a juror who thought he might have
a pre-formed opinion that he did not believe would influence his deci-
sion was not enough to make the trial unfair. The Court said there
must be actual evidence that a juror is biased; otherwise, the trial
judge properly may consider the jury to be fair.9 2
Intense media coverage of notorious cases and famous people con-
tinued in the twentieth century despite threats to fair trials. Outland-
ish newspaper reports surrounded the trial of a labor leader
represented by Clarence Darrow.9 3  The 1935 trial of Bruno
Hauptmann, accused of kidnapping and killing Charles and Anne
Lindbergh's son, was a media circus. 94 Finally, in 1959 the Supreme
marred by the difficulty of finding twelve men every day who don't know any-
thing and can't read." MARK TWAIN AND THE GOVERNMENT 55 (Svend Petersen
ed., 1960).
87. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 201 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1807).
88. See Leslie Renee Berger, Note, Can the First and Sixth Amendments Co-Exist in
a Media Saturated Society?, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTS. 141, 144 (1998) (citing J.
EDWARD GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME 71 (1983)).
89. See Jill Simeone, Note, Mu'Min v. Virginia-Content Questioning for Media Bias
in Jury Selection: Ask Them No Questions, They'll Tell You No Lies, 20 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 439, 443-44 (1993). See generally BUCKNER F. MELTON, AARON
BURR: CONSPIRACY TO TREASON (2001) (relating Burr's actions leading to the trea-
son trial at which Burr was acquitted).
90. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1807). Chief Justice Mar-
shall said requiring jurors with no opinions about the case at all "would exclude
intelligent and observing men, whose minds were really in a situation to decide
upon the whole case according to the testimony." Id. at 51.
91. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878).
92. The Reynolds Court noted that some prospective jurors might feign bias to be
removed from the jury. The Court said a judge should consider mannerisms and
other indicia in determining whether the prospective juror in fact is biased. Id. at
156-57.
93. See GEOFFREY COWAN, THE PEOPLE V. CLARENCE DARROW. THE BRIBERY TRIAL OF
AMERICA'S GREATEST LAWYER (1993) (discussing Darrow's defense of J.J. McNa-
mara and Darrow's subsequent acquittal on charges of bribing jurors).
94. See, e.g., JIM FISHER, THE LINDBERGH CASE 272 (1987) ("On... the first day of the
Hauptmann trial, the Hunterdon County Courthouse was packed with 150 pro-
spective jurors, 100 reporters, 50 cameramen, 25 communications technicians,
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Court for the first time reversed a conviction because news reports
disclosed prejudicial evidence not admitted at trial.95
Two years later, in Irvin v. Dowd,96 the Court said that either a
voir dire showing individual jurors were biased, or evidence of a com-
munity so poisoned with prejudicial publicity that an unbiased juror
could not be found, would show a fair trial would not be possible. 9 7 In
Irvin, the Court overturned a murder decision in the face of eight of
twelve jurors who said during voir dire that they could be impartial,
but, according to the Supreme Court, gave answers indicating that
they thought the defendant was guilty.98 Indeed, 370 of the 430 mem-
bers of the jury pool said during voir dire that they believed the defen-
dant was guilty.99 The community from which the jury was chosen
had been subjected to a barrage of prejudicial news reports, including
stories reporting the defendant's prior criminal recordOO and police
disclosures that the defendant confessed to six murders in a rural
southern Indiana area.' 0 1 The trial court granted a change of venue
to an adjacent county, the only change of venue permitted under state
law. 102
Once again, the Supreme Court said a juror can be fair even if the
juror is not completely unaware of the facts or individuals involved in
prosecution and defense lawyers, dozens of Lindbergh case investigators, 30 mis-
cellaneous police and court officials, and 300 or so spectators who had fought
their way into the courtroom."); see also H. Patrick Furman, Publicity in High
Profile Criminal Cases, 10 ST. THoMAS L. REV. 507, 515 (1998) (describing the
chaos surrounding the Bruno Hauptmann trial).
95. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). The Court said, "prejudice to the
defendant is almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury
through news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution's evidence." Id. at
312-13. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in
Criminal Cases of National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless
Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 39, 52 (1996) (In the Marshall decision, for the first
time, "the court hinted that a trial might be unfair when a juror is exposed
merely to possibly prejudicial publicity."). Seven years earlier than Marshall, the
Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's releasing a confession not admitted at
trial combined with prejudicial press stories did not necessarily amount to a
poisoned community from which a fair jury could not be drawn. Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 181, 194-95 (1952).
96. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
97. See Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (defining the two
prongs as follows: for provable juror bias, "actual partiality or hostility that could
not be laid aside," and for poisoned community, a record that "demonstrates that
the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and in-
flammatory media publicity about the crime.") (citing Irvin, 366 U.S. 717).
98. 366 U.S. at 727.
99. Id. at 727.
100. Id. at 725.
101. Id. at 720.
102. Id.
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a case. 103 A juror only must "lay aside his impression or opinion and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court."104 In Ir-
vin, the Court said, the pretrial publicity "fostered a strong prejudice"
among the entire community, 10 5 creating a "pattern of deep and bitter
prejudice."10 6 Further, the Court noted with concern that "almost
90% of those examined on the point.., entertained some opinion as to
guilt-ranging in intensity from mere suspicion to absolute cer-
tainty." 0 7 Additionally, the Court said that eight of the twelve sitting
jurors thought before the trial that the defendant was guilty.' 0 8 The
Irvin Court, then, said a criminal trial will violate a defendant's con-
stitutional right to a fair trial if there is "clear and convincing"'10 9 evi-
dence that the community from which the jury is drawn is
contaminated with prejudice or if voir dire reveals that one or more
jurors made up their minds regarding guilt prior to hearing the evi-
dence in court.110 Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly use
a "totality of the circumstances" test, it examined the media stories
published prior to jury selection, considered the community size, re-
viewed the voir dire record, and concluded that the level of juror im-
partiality did not meet constitutional standards."'
In Rideau v. Louisiana,112 the Court, "impatient with permissive
trial judges and an exploitative media,"1 13 did not require actual evi-
dence of a biased juror.114 Rather, the Court applied the "presump-
tion of prejudice" concept in overturning a murder conviction after the
region had been "pervasively exposed" to the defendant's filmed con-
fession taken by the sheriff without counsel in the defendant's jail
103. Id. at 722.
104. Id. at 723.
105. Id. at 726.
106. Id. at 727.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 725.
110. See Charles H. Whitebread & Darrel W. Contreras, Free Press v. Fair Trial: Pro-
tecting the Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by Applying
the Sheppard-Mu'Min Remedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1601 (1996) (discussing
the Court's test for evaluating jury bias described in Irvin).
111. See Walton, supra note 73, at 562.
112. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
113. Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 95, at 53 (citing Rideau, 373 U.S. at
726-27).
114. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27. Similarly, in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the
Court did not demand clear evidence of juror bias. Id. at 612 (stating that the
presence of intrusive television equipment in the courtroom, and the act of tele-
vising the trial, made a fair trial impossible). However, in Chandler v. Florida,
449 U.S. 560 (1981), the Court held that merely televising a trial does not, with-
out more, require a finding of an unfair trial. Id. at 586. See also Karla G.
Sanchez, Barring the Media from the Courtroom in Child Abuse Cases: Who
Should Prevail?, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 217 (1998) (contrasting the Supreme Court's
holdings in Estes and Chandler).
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cell.115 The Court found that the trial court denied the defendant's
due process rights by refusing to change venue despite the confession
being televised for three days in the area from which jurors would be
chosen. 116 The Court's conclusion was based on a Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process analysis, presuming unconstitutional jury bias from
a community tainted by prejudicial media reports. 117
Sheppard v. Maxwell 1 18 may be the most celebrated free press-fair
trial case-at least prior to the O.J. Simpson trial.119 In Sheppard,
the Supreme Court followed Rideau in holding that evidence was not
required that one or more jurors were biased to find a trial unfair, at
least in the context of blatantly prejudicial pretrial press coverage and
a "carnival atmosphere" the press created and the judge allowed dur-
ing trial.120 The Supreme Court, in overturning the jury's verdict that
Sam Sheppard was guilty of murdering his wife, focused on the trial
judge's lack of control over the courtroom. However, the Court also
discussed the immense amount of pretrial and during-trial publicity.
Press coverage included a newspaper editorial demanding a coroner's
inquest-and a televised inquest then was held;121 a newspaper head-
line asking why Sheppard was not yet in jail-after which Sheppard
was arrested;12 2 and stories listing the names and addresses of pro-
spective jurors. 12 3 The Court considered the totality of the circum-
stances,1 24 including "the inherently prejudicial publicity which
115. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726.
116. Id. at 724, 726.
117. See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 110, at 1601. In Estes, the Supreme
Court found that televising a criminal trial abridged a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights, in part because the equipment used in the court-
room was cumbersome and noisy, detracting from the trial itself. 381 U.S. at 565.
118. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The Sheppard case spawned a popular television show and
a theatrical movie, both titled The Fugitive. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Lex-
itainment: Legal Process as Theater, 50 DEPAuL L. REV. 539, 548 n.33 (2000).
Sheppard's son, Sam Reese Sheppard, lost a civil suit attempting to clear his fa-
ther's name. See Fox Butterfield, Jury Rejects Innocence of Sheppard in '54 Mur-
der, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 13, 2000, at A20. Sheppard's son also wrote a book about
the case. See CYNTHIA L. COOPER & SAM REESE SHEPPARD, MOCKERY OF JUSTICE:
THE TRUE STORY OF THE SHEPPARD MURDER CASE (1995). For further reading
about the Sam Sheppard Murder Case, see JAMES NEFF, THE WRONG MAN: THE
FINAL VERDICT ON THE DR. SAM SHEPPARD MURDER CASE (2001) and JACK POL-
LACK, DR. SAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1972).
119. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 1017.
120. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358.
121. Id. at 338.
122. Id. at 341.
123. Id. at 342.
124. Id. at 352. Justice Scalia has criticized the Supreme Court's use of the "totality of
the circumstances" test. He said that if one views judicial decisionmaking as a
"dichotomy between 'general rule of law' and 'personal discretion to do justice,'"
the "totality of the circumstances" test falls into the latter category. Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176-79
[Vol. 83:685
SELLING INFLUENCE
saturated the community" and the "disruptive influences in the court-
room," and concluded that the trial court had abridged Sheppard's
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 125
The Court appeared to reverse course after Sheppard, reluctant to
assume that pretrial publicity, without more, could bias jurors and re-
sult in an unfair trial. Instead, in Murphy v. Florida,126 the Court
used a totality of the circumstances test to hold that the defendant
received a fair trial. The Court said the voir dire, although indicating
that some jurors knew of the defendant, did not show that jurors were
hostile to the defendant.12 7 The Court also said that most news sto-
ries about the case were published seven months before the trial, and
even those were primarily factual. 128 The Court concluded that there
were insufficient "indications in the totality of circumstances that pe-
titioner's trial was not fundamentally fair."12 9 The Court said Mur-
phy differed from Irvin130 in that there was no evidence in Murphy
that jurors actually were biased,131 and that it differed from Rideau,
because Murphy did not involve a community poisoned from prejudi-
cial publicity. 13 2 The Court said that mere exposure to information
about a defendant's previous criminal life or to stories about the crime
for which the defendant is being tried did not make a juror biased,
without more evidence-the "totality of the circumstances"-to sup-
port such a claim.133
As it did in Murphy, the Court in Patton v. Yount 1 34 continued to
foreshadow its current approach to jury bias. In Patton, the Court ef-
fectively discarded the "presumption of prejudice" approach. The
Court rejected contentions that pervasive coverage of a crime and ju-
rors' knowledge of the offense and the defendant ineluctably creates
an unfair trial.135 The case involved a defendant convicted of raping
and murdering the victim. Because the defendant's confession was
impermissibly introduced at trial, the conviction was overturned. A
second trial in the same community again resulted in a conviction.
(1989). The test, he said, allows each court to decide for itself what the circum-
stances are and what effect they have on the case before the court. Id. This "is
effectively to conclude that uniformity is not a particularly important objective
with respect to the legal question at issue." Id. at 1179.
125. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
126. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
127. Id. at 801.
128. Id. at 802.
129. Id. at 799, 803.
130. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
131. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803.
132. Id. at 799.
133. Id. at 799, 800-01. See also Minow & Cate, supra note 76, at 644 (discussing the
Murphy decision).
134. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
135. Id. at 1035.
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News reports before the second trial discussed matters not introduced
in court, including the defendant's confession, his conviction in the
first trial, and his temporary insanity plea in the first trial.136 The
Supreme Court noted that all but two of 163 members of the venire
said they had heard about the case and that seventy-seven percent
said they had their minds made up, a percentage higher than in Ir-
vin.13 7 Despite this, the Court said prejudicial publicity for the second
trial was "greatly diminished and community sentiment had soft-
ened."13 8 The Court determined that the important question is not
jurors' recalling the case, but whether the jurors "had such fixed opin-
ions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defen-
dant."139 The Court concluded that the trial judge was correct in
determining that voir dire allowed for a fair jury to be seated.
By 1991, the "totality of the circumstances" took on a lesser role.
In Mu'Min v. Virginia,14o the Court said that voir dire is a sufficient
means for a judge and the lawyers in a criminal trial to determine
juror prejudice. 141 Unless there is a set of circumstances precluding a
fair trial, jurors' statements that they can be fair will be sufficient,
according to the Supreme Court. The Court said there is no constitu-
tional requirement that potential jurors be asked specifically to which
news reports they were exposed. The Mu'Min case involved a defen-
dant who escaped from imprisonment for murder. While fleeing, he
killed a store clerk during a robbery. Considerable press coverage pre-
ceded the second murder trial, including reports about the defendant's
prior criminal record,... the fact that he had been rejected for parole six
times, . . . accounts of alleged prison infractions .... details about the prior
murder for which [the defendant] was serving his sentence at the time of this
murder .... a comment that the death penalty had not been available when
[the defendant] was convicted for this earlier murder..., and indications that
[the defendant] had confessed to killing [the store clerk]. 142
Despite this coverage, which Justice Marshall, in dissent, termed "ex-
ceptionally prejudicial,"'143 the Court found that the stories, and the
total circumstances, did not create a community poisoned with
prejudice. In particular, the Court said the region exposed to the pub-
licity was more heavily populated than the community in the Irvin
case and there were many more murders committed.'44 Further, the
Court said the news articles in the two cases differed markedly. The
reports in Irvin "included details of the defendant's confessions to
136. Id. at 1029.
137. Id. at 1029 n.3.
138. Id. at 1032.
139. Id. at 1035.
140. 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
141. Id. at 431-32.
142. Id. at 418 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 434 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 429.
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twenty-four burglaries and six murders, including the one for which
he was tried, as well as his unaccepted offer to plead guilty in order to
avoid the death sentence. They contained numerous opinions as to his
guilt, as well as opinions about the appropriate punishment."14 5 In
Mu'Min, the media reports "were not favorable, [but] they did not con-
tain the same sort of damaging information," the Court said.
146
B. Fair Juror Standards in Civil Trials
By their terms or by court interpretation, the Sixth 14 7 and Four-
teenth Amendments 148 ensure fair criminal trials. 149 The Seventh
Amendment addresses civil trials, and its primary purpose is to deter-
mine when a civil dispute must be decided at trial.150 Although the
Seventh Amendment does not explicitly guarantee a fair hearing, the
Supreme Court has interpreted it as doing so.
15 1
Civil trials less often are compromised by prejudicial publicity than
are criminal cases. Simply, they draw less pubic attention than crim-
inal trials, being "on the whole, pale and bloodless in comparison" to
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
. . .").
148. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment's guarantee into the Fourteenth
Amendment, thus applying the Sixth Amendment to states).
149. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) ("The failure to accord an ac-
cused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process [under
the Fourteenth Amendment].").
150. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See discussions of the Seventh Amendment's adoption
in, for example, Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966), and Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
151. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("The American tradition of trial by
jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessa-
rily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the commu-
nity."). See also McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554
(1984) (stating that fair civil trial requires voir dire to ensure impartial jury);
Robert P. Bums, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 205,
231 n.119 (2001) ("The Seventh Amendment has yet to be incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment, but similar state constitutional provisions provide a
right to trial by jury in many civil cases.").
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felony cases. 15 2 Even among legal scholars, civil cases largely tend to
be ignored. 15 3 Legal historian Lawrence Friedman says "there is no
full scale history of the American jury," and "what there is-and the
literature is not large-deals mostly with criminal cases."'154 Because
civil trials often fly under the radar, and because in some civil cases ajury's decision cannot be overturned on appeal,15 5 it is likely that an
attorney would believe that airing advertisements favoring his or her
client would be more effective in a civil case than in a criminal case.
Also, civil trials do not put a defendant's freedom or life at risk.
Therefore, a judge in a civil case might be less likely to find that such
advertisements contribute to an unfair trial than if advertisements re-
ferred to a criminal trial.
That certainly is not to suggest civil trial jurors cannot be unduly
influenced by prejudicial communications, including advertisements
related to a pending civil case. In analyzing civil trial jurors' behav-
iors in forming opinions, one group of scholars posited three models ofjuror decisionmaking.156 In the Legal Model, jurors listen as "oppos-
ing attorneys present evidence in the light most favorable to their cli-
ent in a highly stylized and formal manner."157 Then the juror
"determines the facts based on the most persuasive presentation by
the attorneys and applies the governing law to arrive at a legally en-
152. Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective,
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 201 (1998).
153. A recent book on juries, JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND
THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (2000), focuses exclusively on criminal juries. A
landmark book, HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRy (1966), does
the same. See also Friedman, supra note 152, at 201 (noting that historical jury
studies focus mainly on criminal juries).
154. Friedman, supra note 152, at 201.
155. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law.... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
Although the Supreme Court recently has "denigrated the right to jury by al-
lowing judicial intervention that was not found at common law," including per-
mitting appellate court review of jury verdicts in civil trials, Joan E. Schaffner,
The Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth
and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 271 (2002), the
"reexamination clause" nonetheless prevents appellate review of some civil juries'
findings of fact. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tools Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 437 (2001) ("Because the jury's award of punitive damages does not
constitute a finding of 'fact,' appellate review of the District Court's determina-
tion that an award is consistent with due process does not implicate... Seventh
Amendment concerns ... ."). For a summary of events leading to adoption of the
Seventh Amendment, see Victoria A. Farrar-Myers & Jason B. Myers, Echoes of
the Founding: The Jury in Civil Cases as Conferrer of Legitimacy, 54 SMU L.
REV. 1857, 1862-71 (2001).
156. Paula L. Hannaford et al., Communicating with Juries: The Timing of Opinion
Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases: An Empirical Examination, 67 TENN. L. REV.
627 (2000).
157. Id. at 629.
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forceable decision."158 The Story Model "assumes that jurors bring
preconceptions and knowledge of the world to their task, that they ac-
tively construct narratives or stories from trial evidence, and that they
fill in missing details to increase the story's internal consistency and
convergence with their world knowledge." 159 The authors noted that
many studies "using mock jurors have documented the extent to which
jurors .. .filter evidence through preexisting schema, sometimes in
inappropriate ways." 160 What the authors called the Schema-Tailored
Model is a variation on the Story Model; it suggests that jurors in fact
supplement their preconceptions not with evidence presented at trial,
but primarily with attorneys' opening statements.
161
Based on data gathered from jurors in civil trials, these scholars
concluded that the "Story Model continues to be the most credible
model." 16 2 Both the Story Model and the Schema-Tailored Model as-
sume jurors bring to court preconceptions that influence their final
decisions. 163 If so, the influence of case-specific advertisements on po-
tential or actual jurors may be an important-and unacceptable-ele-
ment in juror decisionmaking.
C. Social Scientists' Analysis of Jury Bias
Does pretrial (or during-trial, if the jury is not sequestered) public-
ity cause jurors to be biased? Social scientists have conducted re-
search about media-caused bias for nearly forty years.164 Although
158. Id.
159. Id. at 630.
160. Id. at 632 (citing, for example, Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Compar-
ing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996)).
161. Hannaford et al., supra note 156, at 632-33 (citing DONALD E. VINSON & DAVID S.
DAVIS, JURY PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES AND TRIAL TECHNIQUES 199
(3d ed. 1996)).
162. Hannaford et al., supra note 156, at 652.
163. The Legal Model is based "on the idealized role of the factfinder within the con-
text of an adversarial process." Id. at 629. However:
In practice, the American justice system often departs from the ideals
of adversary procedure, including the notion that jurors are capable of
suspending all judgment until all the evidence has been presented. In-
deed, much of contemporary social science research rejects the Legal
Model as, at best, wishful thinking on the part of judges and lawyers
and, at worst, a complete legal fiction.
Id. at 629-30 (citations omitted).
164. An early study using university students found that one of four mock juries con-
sidered a fictional defendant's past criminal record, reported in a news story, de-
spite a judge's order not to do so. F. Gerald Kline & Paul H. Jess, Prejudicial
Publicity: Its Effects on Law School Mock Juries, 43 JOURNALISM Q. 113 (1966).
See also Christina A. Studebaker & Stephen D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The
Media, the Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 428, 438 (1997)
(describing several similar studies).
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the results of such research have been questioned,165 these studies
have generally found that potential jurors exposed to pretrial publicity
shortly before a legal proceeding are more likely to find defendants
guilty than potential jurors who have not seen news reports about the
case. 166
Jury-bias research commonly uses one of two methods. First, ex-
perimental studies attempt to determine what forms of and content in
pretrial publicity cause prejudiced jurors. Experimental researchers
show to mock juries fabricated news stories that do or do not contain
prejudicial information. Second, field studies are intended to deter-
mine whether potential jurors have been swayed by publicity about a
real case. In field studies, subjects reveal the real-case media infor-
mation to which they have been exposed and what verdict they would
reach as a juror in that case.16 7 Two commentators reviewing a num-
ber of jury-bias studies conclude that "field surveys and experimental
studies both consistently reveal an effect of pretrial publicity on peo-
ple's attitudes about a publicized case."16s
Field studies generally show that people exposed to pretrial news
stories are more disposed to believe the defendant guilty than those
who did not read, see, or hear pretrial reports.169 For example, one
study surveyed 604 potential jurors in one case and 100 in a second
case, inquiring how much they knew about the case, their opinions
about guilt, and their attitudes about crime.170 Those who knew more
about the case from news reports were more likely to say the defen-
dant probably was guilty. Also, respondents who knew more about a
case were disproportionately more prone to assume the defendant's
guilt. Despite this, respondents who knew much about a case and
those who knew little about a case both said they could be fair as
jurors.
Researchers using experimental approaches are able to manipu-
late the news stories given to groups of mock jurors, allowing determi-
nations of the extent to which the reports bias the subjects.171
165. See, e.g., Steven Helle, Publicity Does Not Equal Prejudice, 85 ILL. B.J. 16, 16(1997) (downplaying the prejudicial effect of media coverage on criminal
proceedings).
166. See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal
Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
665, 695 (1991) (finding that exposure to certain prejudicial pretrial publicity bi-
ased mock jury verdicts).
167. See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 164, at 433.
168. Id. at 438. But see, e.g., Helle, supra note 165, at 16 ("The link between publicity
and harmful prejudice has become ingrained in several generations of legal pro-
fessionals, but it defies the evidence and sober reflection.").
169. See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 164, at 433-35.
170. Gary Moran & Brian L. Cutler, The Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity, 21 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (1991).
171. See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 164, at 435.
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Scholars have examined the effects of a variety of information, such as
inadmissible evidence, including past criminal histories and confes-
sions, 172 and inflammatory statements by prosecutors. 173 For in-
stance, one study used an actual case but created a variety of news
stories relating to the case.' 7 4 The college student subjects recorded
their determination of guilt or innocence, then viewed a videotape of
the actual trial, and again gave their assessment of guilt. The pretrial
publicity markedly affected the students' decisions, particularly nega-
tive stories about the defendant's character.
Although most studies about jury bias have focused on criminal
defendants, a few researchers have looked at publicity's effects on civil
cases. One study had college students read a variety of fictional arti-
cles about parties in an actual tort case involving an automo-
bile-pedestrian accident. 17 5 The subjects then saw a videotape of the
trial. The researchers concluded that the pretrial publicity affected
students' assessment of liability. A related study found that "pretrial
publicity influenced not only the judgments of negligence, but also im-
pressions of the parties, memory, and inferences from the trial."176
Jury-bias researchers Christina Studebaker and Stephen Penrod's
review of jury-bias research concluded that studies "demonstrate that
pretrial publicity can affect participants' judgments of the negligence
of the parties in a civil trial. These effects were reflected not only in
the participants' verdicts, but also in verdict confidence, evaluations of
the parties, memory for trial evidence, and inferences from the trial
evidence."17 7
A more recent analysis disagreed. Jon Bruschke and William
Loges stated that "current reviews have vastly overstated the case for
a pretrial publicity effect." 178 Bruschke and Loges concluded that nu-
merous jury-bias studies show no pretrial publicity effect sufficiently
172. See, e.g., Alice Padawer-Singer & Allen H. Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Public-
ity on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
123 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975) (conducting a study to determine how various types
of media effect mock juries).
173. See, e.g., Mary Tans & Steven H. Chaffee, Pretrial Publicity and Juror Prejudice,
43 JOURNALISM Q. 647 (1966).
174. Amy L. Otto et al., The Biasing Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Judgments,
18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 18 (1994).
175. See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 164, at 438 (citing Amy Otto et al., The
Influence of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Judgments in a Civil Case (1990) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
176. Id.
177. Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 164, at 438. See also Nancy Mehrkens Steblay
et al., The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review,
23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 219 (1999) (conducting a meta-analysis of forty-four stud-
ies and finding a moderate positive relationship (r=.16) between prejudicial pre-
trial information and negative assessment of defendants).
178. JON BRUSHKE & WILLIAM E. LOGES, FREE PRESS vs. FAIR TRIALS: EXAMINING PUB-
LICITY'S ROLE IN TRIAL OUTCOMES 134-35 (2004).
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strong to overcome the panoply of remedies available to trial
judges.179 Evidently, social science research has not developed a con-
sensus about the effects of pretrial prejudicial publicity.
IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR ADVERTISING-INDUCED
JUROR BIAS
The Ludlow Massacre advertisements appearing on the Trinidad,
Colorado cable system do not stand alone as examples of exposing po-
tential jurors to advertisements and public relations communications
about pending trials.
Bayer's public relations executives sent letters to 2,100 people in
the Corpus Christi, Texas area before a jury was chosen to hear a law-
suit involving Baycol, Bayer's anticholesterol drug.1SO The letter said
people should "keep an open mind" about the pharmaceutical com-
pany.iS1 Nueces, Texas County Court Judge James B. Klager asked
the county district attorney to investigate Bayer's sending the letter,
which the company said was a mistake and for which it apologized.
Despite the judge's belief that sending the letter was "outlandish,"182
the judge proceeded with the trial, at which the jury exonerated
Bayer.183
After being criminally indicted on conspiracy, obstruction of jus-
tice, and securities fraud charges, Martha Stewart placed a full-page
advertisement in a nationally distributed newspaper, began a website,
and hired a public relations firm.i8 4 The website included a letter
from Ms. Stewart stating facts related to the charges as she saw them
and proclaiming her innocence.
Tobacco companies have complained about an advertising cam-
paign by the State of California Health Department that "bashes ciga-
rettes and the people who make them."185 In a lawsuit filed by a
179. Id. at 136.
180. See Melody Petersen, Judge Criticizes Letter From Bayer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2003, at C14. Bayer took Baycol offthe market because the drug had been linked
to a muscle disorder that can be fatal. As of February 22, 2003, more than 10,000
lawsuits had been filed against Bayer based on the drug. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Melody Petersen, Bayer Cleared of Liability in a Lawsuit over a Drug, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at C1.
184. See Constance L. Hays, Martha Stewart Uses Web to Tell Her Side of Story, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2003, at C1 (quoting a former federal prosecutor as saying, "It's
interesting because [Martha Stewart's websitel is arguably an attempt to influ-
ence the jury pool.").
185. Gordon Fairclough, Cigarette Makers Say California's Ad Tactics Bias Juries,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2002, at B1. In one advertisement, "a fictional tobacco
executive explains: 'If you get a customer while they're young enough, they're
yours for life.' In a convenience store, he points to cigarette ads hanging at
child's-eye level by the candy counter. 'Perfect placement,' he says." Id. A to-
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smoker against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, a company filing said
that "the state's self-proclaimed 'propaganda' campaign has had dev-
astating effects on cigarette companies' right to a fair trial within Cal-
ifornia."l8 6 Reynolds asked the state court judge to dismiss the suit or
grant a change of venue.
The judge in the Wal-Mart case concluded that advertising and
public relations campaigns could prejudice jurors.' 8 7 His solution was
to grant a requested change of venue.18 8 That procedural remedy may
be sufficient in some cases, but not in others.
A. Using the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Suppress
Pretrial Advertising Campaigns
A trial judge may be tempted to use the Supreme Court's commer-
cial speech doctrine to limit pretrial advertising campaigns about
pending cases.' 8 9 Commercial speech is more easily regulated than
news content. After once ruling that commercial speech had no First
Amendment protection, 190 the Court now holds that commercial
speech is less protected than most other forms of expression.191 If
commercial speech is false or misleading, the government is free to
regulate it. 192 However, to regulate commercial speech that is neither
false nor misleading, the government must meet a three-part test.
First, the government must show a substantial interest that justifies
the regulation. 193 Second, the regulation must directly advance the
government's interest. 194 Finally, the regulation must be no more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve the government's interest.19 5
Although as many as five current Supreme Court justices have
questioned whether the commercial speech doctrine is acceptable
bacco company attorney said, "'It's clear that their interest is to influence litiga-
tion.'" Id.
186. Id.
187. Culver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99CV161 (Dist. Ct. Las Animas County,
Colo. filed Dec. 22, 1999).
188. Id.
189. See generally Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing the commercial speech doctrine).
190. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
191. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980).
192. Id. at 563.
193. Id. at 564.
194. Id.
195. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) ("[Olur decisions
require ... a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable."). The Central
Hudson test had required the regulation to be the least drastic means of achiev-
ing the government's goal. 447 U.S. at 564.
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under the First Amendment, 196 it remains in place. That the doctrine
provides less First Amendment protection to commercial speech than
to other types of speech might support a trial judge's order forbidding
advertisements discussing a pending or ongoing trial.
However, the Supreme Court has differentiated between advertise-
ments proposing a monetary transaction197 and those used for other
forms of expression, such as communicating political positions. For
example, the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan198 libel case focused on
an advertisement placed in the Times by several Southern clergy. The
clergy's assertions-political in nature-did not receive diminished
First Amendment protection, because they appeared in the form of a
newspaper advertisement.199 Nor did the Court's finding that the ad-
vertisement contained several incorrect or exaggerated accusations of
police harassment lessen the advertisement's protection in the ab-
sence of deliberate lies or reckless disregard of the truth.20 0
However, courts may choose not to categorize advertisements that
could sway potential or sitting jurors as political rather than commer-
cial speech. For example, Northrop Corporation initiated a television
commercial campaign one week prior to scheduled jury selection in a
case in which the company and several of its former employees faced
charges of conspiracy to defraud the federal government. 20 1 The com-
mercials ran on television stations in Los Angeles, where the trial was
to take place. 20 2 The trial judge granted the government's request for
a restraining order requiring Northrop to stop running the advertise-
ments until after a verdict had been returned in the criminal case. 20 3
196. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571-72 (2001) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509-14 (1996) (joint
opinion of Ginsburg, Kennedy & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
197. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)
(stating that the commercial speech doctrine applies to an expression proposing a
commercial transaction).
198. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW (1991) (provid-
ing a historical account of the events leading up to the Sullivan decision and the
decision itself).
199. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
200. Id. at 271-73.
201. United States v. Northrop Corp., No. CR 89-303 PAR, 1990 WL 71352 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 15, 1990). The charges were based on accusations of "supplying untested
and out-of-specification flight stabilization and control packages" and making
"false and fraudulent statements to the United States." Id. at *1.
202. The commercials were placed in "heavily watched programs," including Los Ange-
les Laker basketball games. Id. at *1.
203. Specifically, the court ordered Northrop not to run commercials
about (1) the character, credibility or reputation of Northrop or its em-
ployees; (2) the identity of a witness or the expected testimony of a party
or witness; (3) the contents of any pretrial confession, admission, or
statement given by a defendant or that person's refusal or failure to
make a statement; (4) the identity or nature of physical evidence ex-
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The court described the commercials as featuring the well-known
test pilot Chuck Yeager:
[Yeager] says to listen to how Northrop people think, and there follows a
cameo by a Northrop employee, saying such things as we try to get things
optimized and that can take years and years of development and simulation
and testing to come up with a design so we can get it just right before it goes in
the aircraft; ... we want to make sure we make aircraft safe for the pilots who
fly them; we've got to be right; we come up with the right design, and build a
model, and test it ... ; we produce the best-if someone's life depends on it
we'll do the best we can; and it's very important to do it right and not miss
something. Yeager closes off the spot with the tag line "Now that's the way
Northrop people think .... "
204
The trial judge said that the advertising campaign "seriously
threatened" the "fair and impartial administration of justice."2 05 The
judge noted the "calculated but subliminal influence on prospective or
impaneled jurors' perception of the character, reputation and state of
mind of Northrop and its employees, as well as the public's perception
of the fairness of the Northrop trial and the impartiality of the trial
proceedings."20 6
The court rejected arguments that the advertisements were not
commercial in nature, and therefore any prior restraint against
Northrop should be based on the Nebraska Press207 test. The court
found the Northrop advertisements to be commercial speech, not a
form of political expression or reporting. Thus, Nebraska Press did not
apply, because that decision involved a prior restraint on the press's
reporting function. 208 The court said that "even though the advertise-
ments are not designed to induce consumers to purchase a specific
product or service, they fall within the definition of commercial
speech," because, as Northrop itself argued, the commercials help re-
cruit high-caliber employees and maintain good relationships with
suppliers, "both economic benefits."
20 9
The court, then, applied the commercial speech line of cases, par-
ticularly Central Hudson.2 10 The court stated that the government
pected to be presented or the absence of such physical evidence; (5) the
strengths or weaknesses of the case of either party; and (6) any other
information Northrop's lawyers know or reasonably show know is likely
to be inadmissible as evidence and would create a substantial risk of
prejudice if disclosed.
Id. at *1-2 (citing Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 599 (9th Cir. 1985)).
204. Id. at *1.
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id.
207. Neb. Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (discussing whether adequate
alternative measures existed in lieu of a prior restraint on publication of state-
ments by the defendant).
208. Northrop, 1990 WL 71352, at *3.
209. Id. at *3.
210. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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had a substantial interest in ensuring a fair trial, 2 1 1 that forbidding
broadcast of the commercials until after a decision was reached would
directly advance the government's interest, and that the restraining
order was not more extensive than necessary to accomplish its pur-
pose.2 12 As to the last point, because the commercials dealt with "cen-
tral issues in the trial,"213 the judge said that no alternative to a prior
restraint-"voir dire, instructions to the jury, sequestration, continu-
ing the trial, [or] change of venue"-could ameliorate the problems the
commercials would cause. 2 14
What, then, was the advertisement Martha Stewart placed in a na-
tional newspaper-commercial speech or an advertisement used to ex-
press ideas the First Amendment fully protects? 21 5 What were the
advertisements carried on the cable system in the small town of Trini-
dad, Colorado?2 16 The Trinidad advertisements did not propose a
commercial transaction-they did not list prescription drug prices2 17
or urge beer purchases. 2 18 Rather, both the Stewart advertisement
and the Ludlow Massacre commercials proclaimed a person's inno-
cence or suggested the correctness of one side in a civil dispute. If
these utterances were made outside the context of newspaper adver-
tisements or television commercials, the First Amendment would pro-
tect them. 21 9
However, the context is not merely advertisements contrasted
with, for example, newspaper articles. The more pertinent context is a
pending criminal or civil trial. The Northrop court quoted with ap-
proval the Ninth Circuit's conclusion: "Even if an impartial jury could
be selected, intense prejudicial publicity during and immediately
before trial could allow the jury to be swayed by extrajudicial influ-
ences."220 As the Northrop court found, advertising is a particularly
211. Northrop, 1990 WL 71352, at *4 ("The fact that these commercials do not make
direct and specific statements about the case does not negate their effect on po-
tential jurors or on the perceived or actual impartiality of the process.").
212. Id. at *4-7.
213. Id. at *2.
214. Id.
215. See text accompanying note 168.
216. See text accompanying notes 9-12.
217. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976) (holding that advertisements providing prescription drug prices were
entitled to First Amendment protection).
218. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507-08 (1996) (holding
that a complete statutory ban on advertisements containing liquor prices violated
the First Amendment).
219. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (stating that the First Amend-
ment prevents the city from banning signs with political messages placed on re-
sidents' lawns).
220. United States v. Northrop Corp., No. CR 89-303 PAR, 1990 WL 71352, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 15, 1990) (quoting Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590,
598 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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intense and prejudicial form of communication. A court should have
power to limit "a major advertising campaign [that is] specifically
targeted to the market from which the jury would be selected" and
that deals with "central issues" in the case the jury is to hear.2 21
B. Using Procedural Remedies to Eliminate Juror Bias
If advertisements related to pending trials are published, is it pos-
sible to ensure that jurors are not influenced by the messages or to
identify potential jurors who have become biased due to such adver-
tisements? The Supreme Court's position is that a carefully conducted
voir dire can ensure that biased jurors are not seated. 22 2
Voir dire is the process by which the venire is winnowed to sitting
jurors and alternates. Although in fact it occurs before the trial be-
gins, it may be the most important part of the trial. It often is said
that the trial is won or lost during voir dire, since the jury selected will
determine the case's outcome. 223
The Supreme Court has emphasized that voir dire is an important
tool for trial judges and attorneys to use in attempting to ensure a fair
jury. The Court gives considerable discretion to trial judges in both
civil and criminal cases in conducting, or allowing attorneys to con-
duct,2 24 the voir dire. 2 25 For example, judges are permitted to conduct
221. Northrop, 1990 WL 71352, at *5, *2.
222. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Court said:
In particular, the trial judge should employ the voir dire to probe fully
into the effect of publicity. The judge should broadly explore such mat-
ters as the extent to which prospective jurors had read particular news
accounts or whether they had heard about incriminating data such as an
alleged confession or statements by purportedly reliable sources concern-
ing the defendant's guilt.
Id. at 602. In Mu'Min v. Virginia, the Supreme Court also said that a voir dire
examination normally will suffice to eliminate potential jurors biased by prejudi-
cial pretrial publicity. 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991).
223. See, e.g., 45 Am. JUR. TRIALS Voir Dire, In General § 144 (1992) ("Experienced
trial lawyers agree that a case can often be won or lost in voir dire."); see also
John H. Blume et al., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1209-10 n.1 (2001) (citing numerous sources support-
ing notion that trials are won or lost during jury selection).
224. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the judge, the attorneys, or both to
conduct voir dire. FED. R. CwV. P. 47(a). Federal judges conduct voir dire alone in
about seventy percent of cases. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America,
62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 292 (1999) (citing JuRY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 54
(G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997)). When judges alone conduct voir dire,
according to one commentator, jury bias rarely is uncovered. Id. However, some
courts frown on a judge excluding attorneys from participating in voir dire. See,
e.g., United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[W]e must ac-
knowledge that voir dire in both civil and criminal cases has little meaning if it is
not conducted by counsel for the parties."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1997).
Taken to the extreme in some states, a judge may not even be present during an
attorney-conducted voir dire in a civil trial. See Landsman, supra, at 219.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the voir dire with individual jurors or to question jurors in groups. 22 6
In no instance, however, may the voir dire be superficial or so care-
lessly conducted that the defendant's or civil party's due process rights
are abridged. 2 27 The Supreme Court has ruled that there is no consti-
tutional requirement that jurors be examined individually2 28 or that
they be asked about the specific pretrial publicity to which they have
been exposed. 22 9
It remains unclear how effective voir dire is in preventing unfair
trials. 23 0 Some courts have held that a well-conducted voir dire is suf-
ficient to confirm that jurors who say they can be fair, despite being
exposed to news stories about the case, indeed are telling the truth.23 1
Social science research may indicate the contrary. Several studies
show that mock jurors shown prejudicial stories did not set aside their
preconceptions, although they claimed they could do So23 2 and this
225. See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895) (stating that voir dire "is
conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity,
be left to its sound discretion. This is the rule in civil cases, and the same rule
must be applied in criminal cases."), cited in Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 422.
226. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 430-31 (upholding a trial court's decision to conduct voir
dire in four juror panels).
227. See, e.g., Cummings v. Dugger, 862 F.2d 1504, 1507 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The stan-
dard [of review] is whether [voir dire] 'created a reasonable assurance that
prejudice of the jurors would be discovered if present.'") (quoting United States v.
Holman, 680 F.2d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 1982)).
228. The American Bar Association recommends that jurors be questioned individu-
ally in certain circumstances:
If there is a substantial possibility that individual jurors will be ineligi-
ble to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the
examination of each juror with respect to exposure should take place
outside the presence of other chosen and prospective jurors .... The
questioning should be conducted for the purpose of determining what the
prospective juror has read and heard about the case and how any expo-
sure has affected that person's attitude....
Am. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
Standard 8-3.5(a) (3d ed. 1991). One law review article says research confirms
that questioning jurors individually is more effective in determining bias than
conducting voir dire in groups. Blume et al., supra note 223, at 1250 (citing De-
bora A. Cancado, Note, The Inadequacy of the Massachusetts Voir Dire, 5 SUF-
FOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADvoc. 81, 96-97 (2000)); Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire
Examinations:An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 503, 511, 528; see also
David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self Disclosure in Voir Dire: A Social Sci-
ence Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 259-60 (1981).
229. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431. The Court does not require questioning of individual
jurors even when issues of racial bias are raised. Id.
230. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 223, at 1231-47 (contending that voir dire fails
to ensure fair trials in death penalty cases).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that
trial judge's properly-conducted voir dire ensured impartial jury, despite jurors
admitting that they knew of the case through media stories).
232. See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 164, at 440-41 (citing Kerr et al., supra
note 166; Stanley Sue et al., Authoritarianism, Pretrial Publicity and Awareness
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problem is exacerbated by the noncognitive impact of advertising.
Studies also indicate that even an extensive voir dire may be ineffec-
tive in ameliorating the results of prejudicial publicity23 3 or in identi-
fying biased jurors.2 34 Some legal scholars agree that voir dire is not
an effective way to determine bias. Specifically, a potential juror may
parrot back what a judge or attorney-authority figures in the court-
room atmosphere unfamiliar to prospective jurors-seem to want to
hear. 23 5 In some instances, a judge may severely limit an attorney's
questioning during voir dire, preventing the attorney from eliciting in-
formation showing bias.236 On the other hand, an attorney simply
may conduct an incompetent voir dire, no matter how much leeway a
judge permits, 23 7 although this may be because the jurors do not un-
derstand an attorney's language. 238
In addition to voir dire, the Supreme Court has suggested a num-
ber of procedural steps judges could take to ensure a fair trial. For
example, after excoriating the trial judge in Sheppard v. Maxwell for
not having control over his courtroom or trial participants, the Court
adamantly said that courts could insulate witnesses, control the re-
lease of extrajudicial prejudicial information by police officers and wit-
nesses, continue a case, change venue, sequester the jury, or order a
new trial.239 Indeed, the Court has ruled that before a trial judge may
of Bias in Simulated Jurors, 37 PSYCHOL. REP. 1299 (1975)); see also Hardaway &
Tumminello, supra note 95, at 64 ("Jurors who may believe themselves to be un-
affected by pretrial publicity may be mistaken. Although the empirical research
still is limited, it appears that jurors who are exposed to factual pretrial publicity
are significantly more likely to convict a defendant than those not exposed when
there has been no delay between the exposure and the trial.").
233. See, e.g., Hedy Red Dexter, et al., A Test of Voir Dire as a Remedy for the Prejudi-
cial Effects of Pretrial Publicity, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 828 (1992)
(finding a fifteen percent higher conviction rate among mock jurors exposed to
prejudicial pretrial publicity compared with subjects not exposed to publicity, and
a fifteen percent higher conviction rate among subjects experiencing extensive
voir dire compared with those experiencing minimal voir dire, regardless of being
exposed to publicity or not).
234. For example, in one study, mock jurors were videotaped as they were subject to
voir dire. Kerr et al., supra note 166. The tapes and information about pretrial
publicity were sent to judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors, who were asked
to identify the jurors they would challenge for bias. Id. The study found that
seated jurors and challenged jurors were equally likely to convict, whether mem-
bers of either group had or had not been subject to pretrial publicity. Id.
235. See Blume et al., supra note 223, at 1233-34.
236. See id. at 1240.
237. See id. at 1243-44. In part, this may be because "[elven experienced trial lawyers
typically have little formal training in voir dire for any type of case (civil or crimi-
nal)." Id. at 1245-46.
238. See id. at 1245.
239. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-63 (1966). See also Neb. Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976) (noting alternatives to prior restraint orders
directed to the press).
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issue a constitutionally valid restrictive order against the press, the
judge must explain why no other procedural remedies, individually or
in combination, would ensure a fair trial.24o However, these sug-
gested procedural approaches to avoiding biased jurors have been pro-
posed in the context of prejudicial news stories. As explained above,
advertisements have different impacts-effects more difficult to dis-
cern and eliminate-than journalistic reports.
C. Gagging Lawyers to Prevent Pretrial Advertising
Campaigns
It may be, then, that a judge must consider barring attorneys from
using advertising to discuss pending cases. 24 1 Although such a ban
implicates First Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court has held
that limiting attorneys' speech is an acceptable means of ensuring a
fair trial.242
Attorneys' use of the media to publicize their side of legal issues is
not new, nor is the recognition that doing so could jeopardize the fair
administration of justice. 2 4 3 As long ago as 1908, the bar adopted an
ethical standard stating: "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to
pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial.., and
otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they
240. Neb. Press, 427 U.S. at 562-64.
241. This does not suggest that a judge may actually prevent attorneys from advertis-
ing for themselves, short of including material pertinent to pending cases. The
Supreme Court has held that states may not prevent attorneys from advertising
their services, Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), although they may
impose limits on attorneys' soliciting of specific clients, Florida Bar v. Went For
It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2003)
("A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer
or the lawyer's services."). Rule 7.1 has been adopted in a majority of the states.
See Bernadette Miraglia, Note, First Amendment: The Special Treatment of Legal
Advertising, 1990 ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 597, 602 n.44 (1991).
242. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1036 (1991) (stating that a
rule prohibiting attorneys from disclosing any information with a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing judicial proceedings is "not necessarily
flawed").
243. A comment to the current model ethical standard recognizes the importance of
balancing attorneys' free speech rights against the constitutional requirements of
a fair trial:
It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair
trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right
to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information
that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial .... On the other
hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of
information about events having legal consequences and about legal pro-
ceedings themselves.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2003).
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are to be condemned."244 Without more clarity,245 this proscription
could not be applied. 246
More recently, after the publicity regarding Lee Harvey Oswald
and President Kennedy's assassination, as well as the Supreme
Court's 1966 decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell,247 in which the Court
overturned a conviction in a trial held in a "carnival atmosphere"248
created by the media, several reports issued by judicial and bar groups
suggested ways to prevent media-created jury bias. The best known of
these, the Reardon Report, recommended using courts' contempt pow-
ers to enforce prior restraints on the press,249 a method the Supreme
Court essentially rejected in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.250
Other reports focused on restraining out-of-court comments by attor-
neys, other officers of the court, and law enforcement officials. 251 Su-
244. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 20 (1908).
245. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The trouble [with
Canon 20] was that the standards were so general and vague that they were
exceedingly difficult to apply and did little to forewarn speakers for publication
about what was proscribed and what was permitted.").
246. See Suzanne F. Day, Note, The Supreme Court's Attack on Attorneys' Freedom of
Expression: The Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada Decision, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1347, 1366 (1993) (observing that Canon 20 "was rarely enforced since it argua-
bly lacks a clear standard for guidance").
247. 384 U.S 333 (1966).
248. Id. at 358.
249. A committee of judges and attorneys, chaired by Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts Chief Justice Paul C. Reardon, issued a report suggesting that re-
stricting attorneys' and other court officers' interviews with the press would limit
prejudicial publicity. But the Reardon Report also noted that in situations where
this would not be completely effective, trial judges should impose restrictive or-
ders on the press and enforce such orders by using the judges' contempt powers.
See ADVISORY Comm. ON FAIR TRIAL & FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 150 (1968).
250. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Court held that a restraining order on the press
amounted to prior restraint that was not justified, because the trial judge failed
to show that: (1) there was or would be prejudicial pretrial publicity, (2) the pub-
licity's effects could not be ameliorated by any means other than a restraining
order, (3) the restraining order would be effective, and (4) any restraining order
issued was not vague or unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 562-70.
251. For example, a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
chaired by Judge Harold Medina, rejected restraining orders on the press, consid-
ering them First Amendment violations, preferring judges to limit trial partici-
pants' and law enforcement officers' public comments. SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO,
TELEVISION, & THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 6 (1967). Similarly, a report
by a committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference, chaired by Judge Irving R. Kauf-
man, advised prohibiting extrajudicial comments by attorneys, other court of-
ficers, and law enforcement officials rather than imposing prior restraints on the
press. Report of the Comm. on the Operation of the Jury Sys. on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 393-94 (1968), revised, 87 F.R.D. 519,
525-528 (1980).
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preme Court decisions indicate these "gag" orders-on anyone
connected with a trial except the press-may be constitutional.25 2
During the same time period, the American Bar Association
("ABA") attempted to provide more precision to an ethics rule limiting
prejudicial attorney comments. 2 53 In 1969, the ABA adopted DR 7-
107 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, prohibiting attor-
neys' out-of-court statements "reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
trial."254 In 1983, DR 7-107 was replaced with Rule 3.6 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, proscribing any "extrajudicial state-
ment that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."25 5 Rule 3.6, then, changed
the "reasonably likely" language of DR 7-107.256
The Supreme Court stepped into this eight-decade-old debate by
deciding Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.2 5 7 But the Court's decision
failed to clarify the issue. The case arose when a Las Vegas attorney,
representing an individual the attorney thought would be indicted for
theft, said at a press conference that his client was innocent and had
been made a "scapegoat" by a dishonest State and "crooked" police. 258
The attorney also suggested another person was the actual culprit. 259
A state bar disciplinary board sanctioned the attorney, an action up-
held by the Nevada Supreme Court.26 0
The United States Supreme Court divided into two groups of four,
with Justice O'Connor providing the fifth vote for each of the
groups.26 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion found the Nevada stan-
dard for limiting attorney speech to be acceptable under the First
Amendment. 26 2 Justice O'Connor agreed. 263 Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion found a "safe harbor" in the Nevada rule to be void for vague-
ness.26 4 Justice O'Connor agreed. 26 5
252. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361 (stating that a trial judge may limit lawyers' and
other trial participants' communication with press).
253. See generally id.
254. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & CANONS OF JuDicIL ETHICS DR 7-107(D)
(1969).
255. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (1983).
256. Rule 3.6, however, did not adopt the "clear and present danger" language then
used in Standard 8-3.1 of the Standards for Criminal Justice.
257. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
258. Id. at 1034.
259. Id. at 1045.
260. Id. at 1033.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1074-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1048-51.
265. Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion said that "the speech of lawyers
representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less
demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press"
in the Nebraska Press case.2 66 Rehnquist justified this on several ba-
ses.26 7 He noted that attorneys' ethics codes have long restricted cer-
tain extrajudicial statements2 68 and that the majority of states' ethics
codes follow this standard. 26 9 Also, attorneys' statements in court are
circumscribed, 27 0 and even attorneys' advertising is not completely
free of restrictions. 27 1 Rehnquist, then, did find the "substantial like-
lihood of material prejudice" standard of Rule 3.6 (and the similar Ne-
vada ethics rule) acceptable, but rejected any notion of a "clear and
present danger" test.2 72 The Court's opinion said: "We agree with the
majority of the States that the 'substantial likelihood of material
prejudice' standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance
between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases
and the State's interest in fair trials."273
The Kennedy opinion argued that attorneys' speech should be pro-
tected by the same standard as political speech, since, according to
Kennedy, that is what speech about legal proceedings is.274 However,
Kennedy could gain a majority only to agree with the Nevada Su-
preme Court275 that the rule's "safe harbor" provision-allowing an
attorney to state "the general nature of the . ..defense," notwith-
standing the rest of the rule-was unconstitutionally vague.
276
266. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074.
267. See Lester Porter, Jr., Note, Leaving Your Speech Rights at the Bar, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 733, 743 (1992).
268. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1067.
269. Id. at 1068.
270. Id. at 1071.
271. Id. at 1073.
272. Id. at 1063, 1074 (explaining that its decisions in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622
(1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), "rather plainly indicate
that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated
under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the
press" in Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)).
273. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075.
274. Id. at 1034 ("T]his case involves punishment of pure speech in the political
forum.").
275. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 787 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1990).
276. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048. This ruling overturned the state bar's sanctions
against attorney Dominic Gentile. Id. at 1057.
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Despite rejecting a portion of Nevada's rule as written, after Gen-
tile, the Supreme Court and the Second, 2 77 Fourth,278 Fifth,279
Sixth,280 Seventh,281 Ninth,282 and Tenth283 Circuits have held that
trial judges may limit the speech of attorneys about pending trials.
The only question is what limiting test constitutionally balances fair
trial guarantees against an attorney's First Amendment right of free
speech.
The Gentile Court did not adopt the "substantial likelihood" test as
a standard. 284 Rather, it "merely approved" Nevada's test.28 5 That
leaves the circuits fractured in choosing a test to apply when a trialjudge limits attorneys' speech about pending trials. It is likely that
the Sixth,286 Seventh,287 and Ninth288 Circuits' decisions to use a
clear and present danger standard no longer are viable after Gentile.
The Supreme Court made clear that the test for restrictive orders on
277. See United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding con-
tempt conviction of criminal defense attorney for violating an order limiting ex-
trajudicial communications under a rule that used a "reasonable likelihood" test);
see also In re Dow.Jones, 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding "reasonable
likelihood" that an order restricting trial participants from speaking to the press
is constitutionally justifiable).
278. See In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that Gentile makes
a "reasonable likelihood" test constitutionally acceptable).
279. See United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2000) (not choosing
between "reasonable likelihood" and "substantial likelihood" tests, but rejecting a
"clear and present danger" test).
280. See United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600-02 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying a "clear
and present danger" standard).
281. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)
(using a "serious and imminent threat" standard).
282. See Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing a "clear and present danger" standard).
283. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666-67 (10th Cir. 1969) (using a
"reasonable likelihood" test).
284. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) ("We agree with the
majority of the States that the 'substantial likelihood of material prejudice' stan-
dard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amend-
ment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State's interest in fair trials.").
After Gentile, the American Bar Association revised Model Rule 3.6 to comport
with the decision. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (1995); see also
Catherine Cupp Theisen, Comment, The New Model Rule 3.6: An Old Pair of
Shoes, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 837 (1996) (discussing the history of rules regarding
attorneys' extrajudicial statements, and criticizing revised Rule 3.6). The ABA
also revised Model Rule 3.8, relating to limits on prosecutors' extrajudicial state-
ments. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c), (d) (1995).
285. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075; see United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 426 (5th Cir.
2000).
286. United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987).
287. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
288. Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985).
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trial participants, including attorneys, cannot be more stringent than
"a substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to judicial proceed-.
ings.28 9 In cases decided after Gentile, the Second29o and Fourth
2 9 1
Circuits adopted the "reasonable likelihood" test. The Tenth Circuit
had done so before Gentile.292 The Fifth Circuit recognized that a
"clear and present danger" test could not be used, but has not yet de-
cided whether it should adopt the "substantial likelihood" or "reasona-
ble likelihood" standard. 29 3
Although it is difficult to know if the Rehnquist portion of the Gen-
tile decision has increased the number of attorneys sanctioned for
speaking publicly about their cases, 29 4 since disciplinary hearings are
confidential, 29 5 there are examples of courts applying the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard to punish lawyers for extra-
judicial statements.296
V. CONCLUSION
While granting Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols' motion for a
change of venue in the Oklahoma Federal Building bombing case, fed-
eral district court Chief Judge Richard Match wrote that jurors may
harbor prejudices they do not know they have:
The existence of such a prejudice is difficult to prove. Indeed it may go unrec-
ognized in those who are affected by it. The prejudice that may deny a fair
trial is not limited to a bias or discriminatory attitude. It includes an impair-
289. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075.
290. United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995).
291. In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1999).
292. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969).
293. United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000).
294. The Supreme Court upheld the portion of the Nevada rule permitting attorneys
to make comments about matters already on the "public record." Attorneys are
skilled at using information, including "public record" information, to make state-
ments favorable to their side and detrimental to their opponents' positions. See
Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 95.
An indictment, which is a public record, need not be limited to bare facts.
In it, the prosecution may tell a story by describing the alleged crime and
what unindicted co-conspirators might have said or done, and so forth.
Likewise, the defense counsel may file pleadings and other papers with
the court that tell the story from the defendant's perspective. These de-
tailed stories, allegations, and explanations become part of the public
record that an attorney may reveal.
Id. at 80.
295. Esther Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In the Aftermath of Gentile: Reconsidering the
Efficacy of Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 494, 498 n.31 (1993) (noting
also that disciplinary proceedings "for violations of trial publicity rules . . . be-
come public knowledge only through the media, or when the cases are appealed to
a district court").
296. See, e.g., Delaware v. Grossberg, 705 A.2d 608 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (revoking
attorney's admission pro hoc vice for violating court order prohibiting attorneys'
public comments about case).
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ment of the deliberative process of deductive reasoning from evidentiary facts
resulting from an attribution to something not included in the evidence. That
something has its most powerful effect if it generates strong emotional re-
sponses and fits into a pattern of normative values.2 9 7
As this Article has argued, advertisements are designed to cause
people to internalize preferences without knowing they have done so.
There are few extrajudicial communications more prejudicial than ad-
vertisements relating to a pending legal case. 29 8 In part, this is be-
cause advertisements differ from news stories.29 9 Instead of making
factual statements that a recipient may accept or reject, advertise-
ments suggest or imply information or gently coerce recipients into
being open to believing certain assertions. It is more difficult for a
reader, listener, or viewer to reject this kind of communication, than it
is to ignore a news story.
An additional reason that advertising as pretrial publicity could
engender a prejudiced jury is that the advertisements may resemble
business-building advertising or public service advertisements
("PSAs"). Since these would not relate to a pending case in an obvious
way, it would be more difficult for a judge to justify issuing a re-
straining order prohibiting an attorney or an attorney's client from
running these kinds of advertisements.300 For this reason, attorneys
wanting to use advertising to influence a jury would not create adver-
tisements that blatantly appeal to potential jurors' biases. That was a
factor in analyzing the impact of the Ludlow Massacre commercials.
Azar and Barkley claimed their advertisements were PSAs on behalf
of a local historical event.3 0 1 The format of the commercials was simi-
lar to PSAs that promote good causes. The quasi-PSA Ludlow com-
mercials exploited typical PSA characteristics, making it more
difficult to identify the actual objective of the advertisements, which
was presumed by the defendant's attorneys and ultimately held by thejudge to establish the "good guy/bad guy" association network.3 02
Business-building advertisements are easier to identify, because they
end with what advertisers call a "call to action"-usually a "call me"
invitation or phone number. The question arises, however, whether a
judge's restraining order would include all advertising by a firm or
just trial-oriented messages, and, if the latter, how business-building
and PSAs could be separated from trial-biasing messages.
297. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1472 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 36-63.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
300. The problem would be convincing a judge that a business-building advertisement
or PSA would meet Gentile's "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" stan-
dard. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075.
301. Record at 499-500, Culver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dist. Ct. Las Animas
County, Colo. filed Dec. 22, 1999) (No. 99CV161).
302. Id. at 478, 505.
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The problem with issue-related advertising preceding a trial is that
it works on emotions and associations that are deeply buried in peo-
ple's minds, which makes it impossible to assess the extent of the im-
pact using conventional attitude and survey research. That is why the
issue of pretrial advertising is not about recall, but rather about im-
pression formation and retrieval, which is more complicated than sim-
ple memory. The triggering process is a subconscious response and
most people are not aware of how it works and how their thoughts are
cued and linked. For these reasons, it is difficult to elicit this informa-
tion through questioning. An association net can lie deep within the
subconscious and not surface unless cued. And when the network of
associations is retrieved, it may come back surrounded by emotions
and judgments that are only relevant in a certain context.
The impact of such advertising is therefore below the level of
awareness; most people would have a hard time not only recalling the
advertisements, but also articulating the impact the advertisements
had on them. These concerns illustrate why advertising should not be
allowed to become part of a trial. They are also the reasons Judge
Quinn, a former Colorado Supreme Court justice who heard the
change of venue motion, decided to find on behalf of Wal-Mart.
For these reasons, it is probable that extrajudicial communications
about pending cases made through advertising present a "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" to the judicial process. Therefore, re-
straining such communications would comport with the Gentile
standards.
In Sheppard, the Supreme Court repeatedly stated that the trial
judge should have "control[led] the release of leads, information, and
gossip to the press by ... the counsel for both sides."30 3 Thus, twenty-
five years before Gentile30 4 the Court was urging judges to limit attor-
neys' out-of-court prejudicial comments as one means of ensuring a
fair trial. Indeed, in response to extrajudicial communications with
the persuasive power of advertising, restraints limiting attorneys'-
and parties'-case-related advertising before and during trials seems
to be the most efficacious way of preventing juror bias.
303. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966); see also id. at 360 ("[Tlhe judge
should have further sought to alleviate this problem by imposing control over the
statements made to the news media by counsel . . . ."); id. at 361 ("[Tjhe trial
court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer .
which divulged prejudicial matters.").
304. Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030.
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